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ABSTRACT 
THREE ESSAYS ON CROSS-LISTING 
Liu Wang 
Old Dominion University, 2010 
Director: Dr. John A. Doukas 
This dissertation examines the role of cross-listing in shaping corporate earnings 
quality, stock price informativeness, and firm valuation, as well as its impact on a listing 
firm's home country information asymmetry and stock misvaluation. 
The first essay addresses the information asymmetry between Chinese local A-
share and foreign B-share markets and its impact on the B-share discount puzzle. In 
contrast with the widespread belief that domestic investors are better informed than 
foreign investors, this study indicates that foreign investors actually possess more value-
relevant, firm-specific information in an emerging market such as China, where 
information transparency and investor protection are relatively weak. As such, the 
observed B-share discount is not compensation for the informational disadvantage of 
foreign investors but, rather, the result of a downward price correction effect. 
The second essay examines the impact of cross-listing on corporate earnings 
management, price informativeness, and firm value, contingent upon increased market 
integration. Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, cross-listed firms are found to have 
better earnings quality, more informative stock prices, and higher valuation than non-
cross-listed firms, even though the divergence between the two groups of firms has been 
less evident since the regulatory reforms of the Chinese stock market liberalization. 
The third essay investigates the role of U.S. listing in mitigating a listing firm's 
home country information asymmetry and stock misvaluation. In contrast with 
conventional theories that predict enormous cross-listing benefits, this study finds no 
significant cross-listing premiums. Further investigation indicates that the absence of 
cross-listing premiums for Chinese firms is mainly a result of a downward price 
correction (toward the fundamental values of the stocks) once U.S. listing allows for an 
enhanced capitalization of firm-specific information. In particular, I find that firms with 
U.S. listings have more informative and less overvalued stock prices than comparable 
home country firms and that exchange-based U.S. listings result in more informative and 
more accurately valued stocks than non-exchange-based listings. 
The empirical findings of these studies suggest a consistent story: cross-listing on 
a more regulated market plays an important role in inducing better corporate governance 
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Over the past few decades, the issue of international listings has been one of the 
primary focuses in modern finance literature. Conventional theories suggest that firms 
list overseas to lower their cost of capital through mitigated investment barriers, reduced 
risk exposure, increased liquidity, visibility, and investor base. While these hypotheses 
have had some success in explaining cross-listing practices, their empirical validity and 
saliency have long been questioned. Major criticisms stem from their failure to explain 
why firms continuously list overseas after the removal of investment barriers; why 
relatively few firms cross-list overseas, given the proposed benefits; and why the market 
reacts more positively if the firm chooses to cross-list on major exchanges as opposed to 
over-the-counter (OTC) and private placements. 
Facing these difficulties of conventional theories in explaining cross-listing 
rationales, a variety of hypotheses have been developed, among which the most 
influential is the bonding hypothesis proposed by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999). 
In the context of the bonding hypothesis, firms cross-list on more regulated markets to 
voluntarily bond themselves to higher regulatory, disclosure, and monitoring standards so 
as to mitigate potential agency conflicts. Built upon this ground, a growing body of 
literature consistently documents evidence that is in line with this hypothesis. For 
example, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) find that foreign companies with shares 
cross-listed in the United States are worth more relative to similar home country firms, 
and Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2009) find that firms' decisions to list 
overseas involve a trade-off between private control and bonding benefits. 
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While there is substantial evidence that the bonding consideration is one of the 
major determinants of a firm's listing decision, whether and to what extent cross-listed 
firms can effectively "rent" the regulatory environment of another country is still an 
empirical question. As Cantale (1996) and Moel (1999) point out, even though cross-
listing has a positive impact on firm value, the observed listing benefits may not 
necessarily be attributable to the bonding role of cross-listing but simply a signaling 
effect. By listing on a market with more stringent disclosure and regulatory requirements, 
a firm can signal the market that it is a high-quality firm, resulting in a higher valuation, 
even though no significant improvement in its corporate governance is made. 
Moreover, another inevitable challenge to the bonding hypothesis is whether and 
to what extent the progressive globalization process and enhanced capital market 
integration will erode the bonding role of cross-listing. Because a necessary condition for 
the bonding hypothesis to be sustained is the divergence in underlying investment 
environments across markets, bonding benefits should be mitigated to a large extent in an 
increasingly integrated world, where regulatory and disclosure requirements are more or 
less standardized. 
These ongoing debates call for direct evidence of the impact of cross-listing in a 
more integrated world. This study addresses the changing role of cross-listing in shaping 
corporate behavior in the context of earnings management, stock price informativeness, 
and firm valuation, as well as its impact on a listing firm's home market information 
asymmetry and stock misvaluation, contingent upon increased market integration. 
China has been chosen as the research focus of this dissertation for two reasons. 
First, interest in understanding the Chinese capital market has grown commensurately 
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with China's economic development and its increased integration with the world 
economy. Nevertheless, empirical evidence to date has been rare and inconclusive in 
documenting the impact of cross-listing on Chinese firms, and China has been excluded 
from many influential studies. Therefore, testing the generalizability of the bonding 
hypothesis for Chinese firms offers an important building block to the literature. 
Second, while the issue of cross-listing has stimulated a considerable amount of 
quality research, a common limitation associated with these studies is that they tend to 
consider cross-listing impact within a static framework. The effect of globalization on 
the dynamics of cross-listing (and delisting) decisions is largely ignored. In an 
increasingly integrated world, observing a significant bonding impact is not the end of the 
story. A more relevant and important question to address is whether and to what extent 
the progressive globalization process and enhanced capital market integration affect the 
role of cross-listing. The structural segmentation and subsequent liberalization of the 
Chinese stock market provide us with an ideal laboratory for testing this issue. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY, PRICE DISCOVERY, AND THE 
CHINESE B-SHARE DISCOUNT PUZZLE 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
As capital markets become more and more globally integrated, the issue of 
information asymmetry in international equity markets is becoming increasingly crucial. 
Despite general agreement on the presence of information asymmetry, the issue of 
whether or not domestic investors are better informed than foreign investors remains 
controversial, especially in emerging contexts. Some researchers argue that domestic 
investors are better informed because they have linguistic, cultural, and regulatory 
advantages (e.g., Brennan and Cao, 1997; Chan, Menkveld, and Yang, 2008), whereas 
others point out that foreign investors have an informational advantage in emerging 
markets because they are more experienced and subject to less information censorship 
(e.g., Chui and Kwok, 1998; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000). 
In the context of China, one major contribution of the information asymmetry 
analysis is that it points to a possible explanation for the Chinese B-share discount puzzle. 
Prior to Chinese stock market liberalization in 2001, Chinese firms could issue two 
classes of stocks, identical in all aspects except for their ownership restrictions: A shares, 
which could only be held and traded by Chinese domestic investors, and B shares, which 
could only be held and traded by foreign investors. As a result, the Chinese stock market 
is divided into two separate markets: the local A-share and foreign B-share markets. 
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In segmented markets where companies issue restricted shares that are only 
available to domestic investors and unrestricted shares that can be held and traded by 
foreign investors, unrestricted shares are traded uniformly at a premium relative to their 
restricted counterparts (e.g., Bailey, Chung, and Kang, 1999). In China, however, 
unrestricted B shares are traded at a large discount, a fact that is often referred to as the 
"Chinese B-share discount puzzle" (Bailey et al., 1999; Bailey and Jagtiani, 1994; Chan 
et al., 2008; Yang and Lau, 2005). This sharp contrast has attracted a substantial body of 
research, among which the most influential is the uninformed foreign investor hypothesis. 
The idea is that, due to language barriers, different accounting standards, and weak access 
to local information, foreign investors often have less information than domestic 
investors, and, hence, require a higher premium (stock price discount) in the B-share 
market (e.g., Chakravarty, Sarkar, and Wu, 1998; Chan et al., 2008). A major deficiency 
of this argument stems from its generalizability to emerging markets. 
In an environment with limited investor protection, ineffective legal enforcement, 
and ill-functioning accounting-auditing systems, neither foreign nor domestic investors 
are in possession of sufficient value-relevant, reliable corporate information. 
Consequently, Chinese investors are often regarded as speculators who trade on rumors, 
rather than informed investors who trade on fundamentals (e.g., Ma, 1996; Mei, 
Scheinkman, and Xiong, 2003). Additionally, the movements of Chinese stocks are 
found to be highly synchronous with the movements of the market rather than reflecting 
firm-specific information (e.g., Chan and Hameed, 2006; Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000). 
A comparison of price synchronicity among 40 countries placed China the second highest 
worldwide (Morck et al., 2000). The fact that Chinese domestic A shares are not 
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informative per se has been a large factor in questioning the uninformed foreign investor 
interpretation of the B-share discount puzzle. More interestingly, Chui and Kwok (1998) 
find that in an emerging market such as China, foreign investors are actually more 
informed than domestic investors. 
The ongoing debate over the issue of whether or not domestic investors are better 
informed than foreign investors in emerging markets gives rise to the first motivation of 
this study. Using a panel sample of Chinese firms that issue both local A and foreign B 
shares, I find that foreign investors tend to be more informed than domestic investors in 
an environment with weak investor protection and limited information transparency. 
Additionally, this study explores more deeply the controversy over the information-based 
interpretation of the B-share discount puzzle. With informed foreign investors and 
inherent home market stock misvaluation, the observed Chinese B-share discount is not 
compensation for the informational disadvantage of foreign investors but, rather, the 
result of a downward price correction (toward the fundamental values of the stocks) once 
more firm-specific information is capitalized by sophisticated foreign investors. Finally, 
despite the overwhelming focus on the structural segmentation of the Chinese stock 
market, little, if any, attention has been paid to investigating the magnitude of 
information asymmetry and the B-share discount, taking into account recent regulatory 
reforms in China. Whether and to what extent recent market liberalization reforms affect 
the information environment and the B-share discount in China is still an open question. 
This study also bridges this gap. 
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The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses 
the development of the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and model specifications. 
Section 4 reports the empirical results, followed by concluding remarks in Section 5. 
2.2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.2.1. Information Asymmetry 
Despite the growing importance of the problem of information asymmetry in 
international equity markets, the issue of whether or not domestic investors are better 
informed than foreign investors remains controversial, especially in emerging contexts. 
In the literature, it is widely believed that foreign investors have an informational 
disadvantage relative to domestic investors due to the former's lack of linguistic, cultural, 
and regulatory knowledge and weak access to local information (e.g., Brennan and Cao, 
1997; Chakravarty et al., 1998; Chan et al., 2008). 
In support of the uninformed foreign investor hypothesis, Chan et al. (2008) point 
out that foreign investors tend to face more severe information asymmetry in an emerging 
market with limited investor protection and weak information transparency. In China, for 
example, due to the lack of investor protection, firms often do not fully disclose material 
changes in their business conditions, corporate managers freely manipulate firm-specific 
information, and insider trading is widespread. This is the very case facing the Chinese 
stock market. However, this argument ignores the fact that Chinese domestic investors 
are likely to face the same degree of information asymmetry as foreign investors. 
In an environment with limited investor protection, ineffective legal enforcement, 
and ill-functioning information infrastructure, domestic investors may not necessarily be 
8 
more informed than foreign investors. In China, investors are frequently regarded as 
speculators who trade on rumors rather than informed investors who trade on 
fundamentals (e.g., Ma, 1996; Mei et al., 2003). Moreover, price movements are found 
to be highly synchronous with the movements of the market rather than reflecting firm-
specific information (e.g., Chan and Hameed, 2006; Morck et al., 2000). The fact that 
Chinese domestic A shares are not informative per se plays a major role in questioning 
the uninformed foreign investor interpretation of the B-share discount puzzle. 
In this study, I expect foreign B-share investors to be better informed than 
domestic A-share investors. I justify this argument on three grounds. First, the 
disclosure requirement is stricter for firms with B-share listings. In China, firms that 
issue shares to both domestic and foreign investors are required to prepare their financial 
statements based on both the Chinese Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
and the International Accounting Standards (IAS), whereas firms that issue shares 
exclusively to domestic investors are subject solely to the Chinese GAAP. The increased 
financial reporting standard in the B-share market will, to a large extent, mitigate 
information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders. Second, the B-share 
market is more regulated and subject to less information censorship. The increased 
investor protection and enhanced information transparency in the B-share market will 
undoubtedly facilitate timely information transmission and promote informed trading. 
Third, foreign investors participating in the B-share market are often more sophisticated 
than Chinese domestic investors in collecting, processing, and analyzing value-relevant 
corporate information. If foreign investors are more informed, then it is rational for 
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Chinese domestic investors to follow those relatively informed foreign investors in their 
decision-making processes. 
In the literature, a popular way to address the direction of information flow is to 
investigate the lead-lag relation between the two markets. In a perfect market with no 
information asymmetry, all available information should be incorporated into stock prices 
instantaneously. However, if some investors have an informational advantage relative to 
others, then a large portion of information will be impounded into stock prices by 
uninformed investors with a lag after observing the action of informed investors. 
Consistent with this argument, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) find that past returns of large 
firms lead current returns of small firms; Badrinath, Kale, and Noe (1995) find that 
returns on stocks with high institutional ownership lead returns on stocks with low 
institutional ownership; Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993) and Chanand and 
Hameed (2006) find that returns of firms with high analyst coverage lead those of firms 
with low analyst coverage. These findings suggest that there is a significant lead-lag 
relation between informed and uninformed parties, and that uninformed investors tend to 
follow informed investors in their decision making processes. 
In the context of this study, the informed foreign investor hypothesis implies that 
information will tend to flow from foreign to domestic investors in an emerging market 
such as China, and that the movements in the B-share market will lead those in the A-
share market. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed. 
HI: Foreign investors are better informed in an emerging market such as China, 
and the movements in the B-share market will lead those in the A-share market. 
Besides the information flow analysis, another effective way to address the 
direction of information asymmetry is to compare the price informativeness between the 
two classes of stocks. If domestic investors are better informed, then A-share prices 
should be more value-relevant relative to their B-share counterparts. On the contrary, if 
foreign investors are better informed, then B-share prices should be more informative 
compared to their A-share counterparts. 
Drawing on state-of-the-art finance literature, this study uses price synchronicity 
to measure stock price informativeness. As Roll (1988) points out, the extent to which 
stocks move together depends on the relative amounts of firm-level and market-level 
information incorporated into stock prices. In the past two decades, a growing body of 
literature consistently provides empirical support for this information-based interpretation 
of stock synchronicity. For example, Morck et al. (2000) find that stock prices move 
together more in emerging markets, where reliable firm-specific information is either 
technically unavailable or prohibitively costly. Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin 
(2003) indicate that the relationship between current returns and future earnings is 
stronger for firms and industries with low price synchronicity. Durnev, Morck, and 
Yeung (2004) document a positive association between the economic efficiency of 
corporate investment and the magnitude of firm-specific variation in stock returns. Jin 
and Myers (2006) find that stock price synchronicity decreases with the level of 
information transparency. Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010) note that foreign ownership and 
auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity and that the amount of firm-
level information reflected in stock prices is lower for firms with high synchronicity. 
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These empirical findings point to a single story: higher firm-specific return variation (as a 
fraction of total variation) indicates more informative stock prices. 
This can also be justified easily on conceptual grounds. Theoretically, this stream 
of research is developed upon a hypothesized decomposition of information in stock 
pricing. The idea is that if asset prices can be considered as a function of both firm-
specific and market-wide information, then in an environment with significant 
impediments to informed trading, investors will have to rely more on market-wide 
information, resulting in a higher degree of stock co-movement. On the other hand, in an 
environment with sufficient investor protection and information transparency, stock 
prices will tend to be less synchronous with each other due to informed trading. 
In the context of this study, the informed foreign investor hypothesis implies that 
foreign B-share prices should be more informative (less synchronous) than their A-share 
counterparts. Therefore, the following hypothesis is derived. 
H2: Foreign investors are better informed in an emerging market such as China, 
and foreign B-share prices are more informative than local A-share prices. 
2.2.2. The B-Share Discount Puzzle 
In segmented markets where companies issue restricted shares that are only 
available to domestic investors and unrestricted shares that can be held and traded by 
foreign investors, unrestricted shares are traded uniformly at a premium relative to their 
restricted counterparts (e.g., Bailey et al., 1999; Bailey and Jagtiani, 1994; Domowitz, 
Glen, and Madhavan, 1997; Hietala, 1989; Stulz and Wasserfallen, 1995). In China, 
however, unrestricted B shares are traded at a large discount (e.g., Bailey et al., 1999; 
Bailey and Jagtiani, 1994; Chan et al., 2008; Yang and Lau, 2005). This difference is 
considered a "puzzle" because, in theory, given that foreign investors can diversify away 
a large portion of the risk associated with Chinese B shares through non-Chinese stocks, 
the required return should be lower for foreign B shares than for local A shares, resulting 
in a B-share premium rather than a discount. 
The sharp contrast between the Chinese and other capital markets has attracted a 
substantial body of research. Nevertheless, empirical evidence to date has been 
inconclusive in interpreting the causes of the discount. Overall, frequently documented 
explanations can be roughly classified into four streams. 
The first stream of research relies on the theory of supply and demand. On the 
one hand, the lack of alternatives to low-yielding bank accounts in China drives domestic 
savings into the A-share market and pushes A-share prices up, beyond parity (e.g., Bailey 
and Jagtiani, 1994; Fernald and Rogers, 2002). On the other hand, the existence of the 
Hong Kong H-share market provides a good substitute for the B-share market, granting 
higher demand elasticity to the B shares (e.g., Sun and Tong, 2000). Both effects tend to 
inflate the A-share prices and deflate the B-share prices. The major criticism concerning 
this hypothesis stems from its failure to explain the cross-sectional variation in A-share 
premiums (Chan et al., 2008). 
The second line of research attributes the price differential between the two 
classes of stocks to the speculative behavior of Chinese investors. Because Chinese 
security markets are extraordinarily risky, domestic investors tend to be highly risk 
tolerant and speculative, diverting A-share prices from a rational level (e.g., Ma, 1996; 
Mei et al., 2003). While Mei et al. (2003) find that the A-share turnover rate, which 
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proxies for the amount of speculative trading, explains about 20% of the cross-sectional 
variation in A-share premiums, a large portion of the variation remains unexplained. 
The third school of research considers the Chinese B-share discount as 
compensation for the B shares' lack of liquidity and high trading costs (e.g., Chen, Lee, 
and Rui, 2001; Chen and Xiong, 2001). This hypothesis, however, cannot explain why 
other capital markets with similar ownership restrictions do not experience the same 
pattern of foreign share discount. 
The last thought of research is built upon the information asymmetry hypothesis 
developed by Brennan and Cao (1997). The idea is that due to language barriers, 
different accounting standards, and weak access to local information, foreign investors 
often have less information than domestic investors, and hence, require a higher premium 
(stock price discount) in the B-share market (e.g., Chakravarty et al., 1998; Chan et al., 
2008). Given that the primary focus of this study is information asymmetry, whether and 
to what extent other schools of research help explain the B-share discount is beyond the 
scope of this essay. 
In support of the uninformed foreign investor hypothesis, Chan et al. (2008) point 
out that foreign investors face more severe information asymmetry in an emerging market 
such as China, where firms often hide material changes in their business conditions, 
corporate managers freely manipulate firm-specific information, and insider trading is 
widespread. A major deficiency concerning this hypothesis, however, stems from its 
generalizability to emerging contexts. The argument is that in an environment with 
limited investor protection and poor information transparency, domestic investors may 
not necessarily be better informed than foreign investors. In contrast, foreign investors 
are found to be more efficient in collecting and processing value-relevant, firm-specific 
information in such environments (e.g., Chui and Kwok, 1998). 
If foreign investors do not have an informational disadvantage, then the question 
becomes whether the issue of information asymmetry still contributes to our 
understanding of the B-share discount puzzle. To better illustrate this point, it is 
important to understand two idiosyncrasies associated with the Chinese stock market. 
First, Chinese domestic shares are universally overvalued relative to their fundamentals. 
One possible explanation is that the lack of alternatives to low-yielding bank accounts in 
China drives Chinese domestic savings into the stock market and pushes stock prices up, 
beyond parity (e.g., Bailey and Jagtiani, 1994; Fernald and Rogers, 2002). Additionally, 
the highly risk-tolerant and speculative behavior of Chinese investors also contributes to 
the deviation of Chinese stock prices from a rational level (e.g., Ma, 1996; Mei et al., 
2003). Second, in China, the movements of stocks are highly synchronous with the 
movements of the market rather than reflecting firm-specific information (e.g., Chan and 
Hameed, 2006; Morck et al., 2000). This phenomenon can be well explained by the 
information-based interpretation of stock price synchronicity. If asset prices can be 
considered as a function of both firm-specific and market-wide information, then 
investors will have to rely more on market-wide information in an environment where 
credible firm-specific information is either technically unavailable or prohibitively costly, 
resulting in more synchronous stock movements. 
Because the B-share market is associated with a higher level of regulatory and 
disclosure standards, less information censorship, and more sophisticated investor base, 
one should expect foreign B-share investors to be more efficient in collecting and 
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processing value-relevant corporate information than local A-share investors. 
Consequently, more firm-specific (less market-wide) information should be capitalized 
into B-share prices, resulting in more accurate stock valuation. With inherent stock 
overvaluation, this implies that B-share prices should be less overvalued due to informed 
trading. Therefore, in a world with informed foreign investors and inherent stock 
overvaluation, the so-called B-share discount is mainly a result of a downward price 
correction (toward the fundamental values of the stocks) once more firm-specific 
information is incorporated into stock pricing. If this is the case, then one should observe 
a positive relation between the magnitude of the discount and the capitalization of firm-
specific information (as measured by price synchronicity). 
Based on the above discussions, the following hypothesis is derived. 
H3: With informed foreign investors, the B-share discount is mainly a result of a 
downward price correction once more firm-specific information is capitalized; the more 
informative the stock prices, the larger the discount. 
2.2.3. Impact of Market Liberalization 
Observing the information asymmetry between foreign and domestic investors, 
however, is not the end of the story in today's increasingly integrated world. A more 
interesting and important question to address is whether and to what extent the regulatory 
reforms of market liberalization—that is, the opening of the foreign B-share market to 
Chinese domestic investors on February 19, 2001 and the opening of the domestic A-
share market to qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) on November 5, 2002— 
affect the patterns of information asymmetry and B-share discount. While it is unlikely 
for the processes of market liberalization to entirely eradicate the difference between the 
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two markets, mitigated information asymmetry and reduced price disparity are expected. 
First, because the disclosure and regulatory requirements across the two markets have 
been increasingly standardized since the regulatory reforms, the information asymmetry 
between local A-share and foreign B-share markets should be less prominent. Second, 
the capabilities of investors to collect and process value-relevant, firm-specific 
information should be less divergent after market integration, since the investor base is 
more or less the same across the two markets. Therefore, one hypothesizes the following. 
H4: Both information asymmetry and price disparity between the two markets are 
mitigated upon the regulatory reforms of market liberalization. 
2.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1. The B-Share Discount 
The approach to testing the issues of information asymmetry and B-share discount 
in this study departs from previous research in that, instead of examining aggregate-level 
data such as market indices, I investigate the price dispersion between the local A and 
foreign B shares that are issued by the same companies (hereafter termed the twin-share 
portfolios). This is a more precise approach since it directly addresses the divergence 
between the two classes of stocks as issued by the same companies and, in the meantime, 
mitigates the data comparability and omitted-variables problems. 
Given that not all Chinese publicly listed firms issue shares to both domestic and 
foreign investors, this study focuses only on firms that issue both local A and foreign B 
shares. To facilitate a meaningful comparison, firms that list on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) are considered separately. 
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Using balanced panel data, I further require the sample firms to be continuously listed on 
either the SSE or the SZSE for at least 10 years at the time of estimation. After 
eliminating firms with insufficient histories or missing values on related variables, 
companies with incomparable sizes, enterprises in financial industries, and those with 
foreign listings other than B-share listings, there are 53 firms left. The final sample, 
therefore, consists of 53 firms (26 SSE-listed and 27 SZSE-listed), each with a 
continuous dual-listing history during the entire sample period, from October 1997 to 
September 2007. 
In this study, both firm-level data and stock market figures are compiled from the 
China Stock Market and Accounting Research database (CSMAR). To facilitate a more 
rigorous analysis, daily data series is utilized, where the trading day closing price is used 
in calculating continuously compounded returns. To control for the impact of market 
liberalization, I further divide the sample into three subperiods: the pre-market-
liberalization period, the post-market-liberalization period, and the period of market 
restructuring. The subperiods are truncated by the two regulatory reforms, i.e., the 
opening of the foreign B-share market to Chinese domestic investors on February 19, 
2001 and the opening of the domestic A-share market to QFII on November 5, 2002. The 
time frame is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
***Insert Figure 2.1 about here*** 
Table 2.1 presents the price differential between the local A and foreign B shares 
issued by the same companies, sorted by exchange listing (SSE or SZSE) and time period 
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of estimation (i.e., the pre-market-integration period, the post-market-integration period, 
and the market restructuring period). 
***Insert Table 2.1 about here*** 
Consistent with previous studies that document a significant B-share discount, 
Table 2.1 indicates that the currency-adjusted B-share prices are much lower, on average, 
than the corresponding A-share prices. This is particularly true in the pre-market-
liberalization period: the average currency-adjusted B-share prices are 2.13 and 2.71 for 
SSE- and SZSE-listed firms, respectively, whereas the prices of their A-share 
counterparts are 11.99 and 11.65 for SSE- and SZSE-listed firms, respectively. In line 
with H4, which predicts a mitigated level of B-share discount after market restructuring, 
the price differential shrinks dramatically in the post-market-liberalization period on both 
markets. The mean difference declines from 9.86 to 3.80 on the SSE and falls from 8.94 
to 2.93 on the SZSE. 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 confirm this pattern graphically. As can be seen, there is a 
significant price differential or B-share discount during the pre-market-integration period, 
from October 1, 1997 to February 19, 2001. However, the divergence between the two 
classes of stocks becomes less evident during the post-market-integration period, from 
November 5, 2002 to September 30, 2007. 
***Insert Figure 2.2 about here*** 
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* * *Insert Figure 2.3 about here * * * 
2.3.2. Information Flow 
This study applies a vector autoregression (VAR) methodology to investigate the 
lead-lag relation between foreign and domestic investors. For a more robust analysis, 
firms listed on the SSE and the SZSE are considered separately. Therefore, the 
regulatory segmentation of the local A-share and foreign B-share markets, together with 
the two exchange choices, divides the Chinese stock market into four segmented markets: 
the Shanghai A-, Shanghai B-, Shenzhen A-, and Shenzhen B-share markets. In order to 
obtain a more complete picture, the two pairs of twin-share portfolios (i.e., SSE-listed A 
and B twin-share portfolios and SZSE-listed A and B twin-share portfolios) are 
considered simultaneously in an integrated VAR system. Borrowing the idea from the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM), corresponding market returns are also included in 
the simultaneous equations as additional exogenous variables. Specifically, the following 
VAR system is estimated: 













SZB, SZBt_k SZBIt_, SSZB,t 
where SHAt and SHBt are the SSE-listed twin-share portfolio returns at time t, and SZAt 
and SZBt are the SZSE-listed twin-share portfolio returns at time t. Note that the final 
sample consists of 26 SSE-listed firms and 27 SZSE-listed firms, each of which has a 
continuous dual-listing history over the entire sample period. The variables SHAIt, 
SHBI,, SZAIt, and SZBIt are the corresponding market returns at time t. Here, A^ is a 4 
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X 1 column vector, Ak and B, are both 4 X 4 matrices of coefficients, k is the number of 
lagged endogenous variables, and I is the number of lagged exogenous variables. The 
zjth component of Ak measures the direct impact that an innovation on the y'th market 
would have on the zth market in k periods. 
Table 2.2 reports the correlation matrix of the twin-share portfolios with one 
another and with the four market indices. As Table 2.2 indicates, the correlation 
coefficients between the A and B twin-share portfolios are highly significant (0.60 for 
SSE-listed firms and 0.63 for SZSE-listed firms), indicating a high degree of 
contemporaneous interdependence between the A and B shares that are issued by the 
same companies. In other words, a large portion of innovations in one market will be 
shared by the other on the same calendar day. Moreover, the correlation coefficients 
between individual portfolios and market indices are all significant (ranging from 0.55 to 
0.98), implying that the movements of individual stocks are highly synchronous with 
those of the market. 
***Insert Table 2.2 about here*** 
In addition to the integrated VAR system, firms that are listed on the SSE and the 
SZSE are also investigated separately. In particular, the following simultaneous equation 
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where A^ is a 2 X 1 column vector, AK and BL are both 2 X 2 matrices of coefficients, 
and all the other variables are defined as in equation (1). 
The order of VAR is determined by comparing the information criteria among 
model specifications with lag lengths ranging from 1 to 20 (i.e., from one day to one 
month). For a more precise specification, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the 
Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC) are considered jointly in this study. The statistics of 
the information criteria for model specifications with 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, and 20 lags are 







***Insert Table 2.3 about here*** 
According to Table 2.3, the VAR with 1 lag seems to be the most appropriate 
identification for all three model specifications, suggesting that a large portion of 
innovations in one market are transmitted to another within two calendar days. Therefore, 
the order of VAR is chosen to be 1 throughout the study. 
2.3.3. Stock Price Informativeness 
In line with the literature (e.g., Chan and Hameed, 2006; Morck et al., 2000; Roll, 
1988), this study uses the R-squared value from the regression of the CAPM to measure 
the departure of firm-specific stock movements from the market. Since the omitted-
variables problem is generally less of a serious concern for panel models than for cross-
sectional models (because the past values of the variables in the panel will partly control 
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for the effects of the missing variables), the Sharpe-Lintner-Black model seems to be 
capable of testing this issue. 
Note that in the literature, many studies include industry returns in the regression 
(see, for example, Durnev et al., 2004; Gul et al., 2010; Roll, 1998). It is argued, 
however, that in studies that focus on emerging markets, the inclusion of industry returns 
in the regression as an additional independent variable might be problematic, because of 
the difficulties in disentangling the industry effect from the market and the fact that some 
industries are dominated by a few firms (e.g., Chan and Hameed, 2006). This study 
follows Chan and Hameed's approach.1 In particular, the following model is estimated: 
( ^ - O ^ + W f - t f V * . (4) 
p 
where Rjt is the stock return for each individual firm at time t, that is, Rjl =log(—1—)*100; 
pM 
R™ is the market return at time t, that is, RtM = l o g ( - ^ ) * 100; Rf is the risk-free rate 
P/-1 
(China's monthly yield of the three-month household deposit interest rate) at time t\ and [i 
is the covariance of the market return with the portfolio return divided by the variance of 
the market return. The R-squared values from equation (4) are then used to measure the 
departure of firm-specific movements from the market. Specifically, 
R2= 1 (5) 
According to the Hausman specification test, the one-way random effects model 
is utilized. This means that, in general, the residual consists of two parts, that is, 
1 As a robustness check, additional models with industry returns are also investigated, where the results are 
statistically unaffected. 
ejt - ui + vu. For a more precise estimation, the error components model and generalized 
least squares (GLS) estimation are also applied. 
In the context of this study, H2 implies that stock prices will tend to be more 
informative (less synchronous) among foreign B shares than among local A shares, as 
reflected by a lower R-squared value, that is, R2B < R2A . In addition, H4 predicts a 
reduced level of information asymmetry after market liberalization. If this is the case, 
then the divergence in price informativeness between the two classes of stocks should be 
less evident after the processes of market restructuring, as reflected by a convergence in 
regression R-squared values. 
2.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
2.4.1. Information Flow 
Table 2.4 reports the regression results of the VAR systems during the pre-
market-liberalization period, from October 1, 1997 to February 19, 2001, based on three 
different model specifications. First, the empirical results generated from different model 
specifications are highly consistent, suggesting that the models are well specified. In 
terms of portfolio returns (columns 1-4), I find a significant dependence of A-share 
returns upon the past movements of their B-share counterparts, especially for the SSE-
listed firms. Additionally, the past returns of Shenzhen B shares tend to have some 
predictive power on their own future returns. While Table 2.4 documents significant 
Granger causality between the twin-share portfolios, an inconsistency has to be noted. 
The signs of some coefficient estimates are negative. Technically speaking, the signs of 
the coefficients in simultaneous equation systems are hard to interpret because of the 
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multidimensional, simultaneous impacts among exogenous variables. Theoretically, one 
possible explanation of the observed negative coefficient estimates is that Chinese A-
share investors tend to overreact to movements in the B-share market at the very first 
moment and then experience a self-correction process the following day. Note that the 
contemporaneous impact is not reflected in the VAR systems but in the correlation matrix 
in Table 2.2. In terms of market returns, the Shenzhen B-share market appears to play a 
significant leading role in predicting individual stock returns (column 8 of Table 2.4). 
Overall, the results in Table 2.4 suggest that, under perfect market segmentation, the 
information tends to flow from the B-share market to the A-share market and that foreign 
investors are better informed than Chinese domestic investors {HI is supported). 
***Insert Table 2.4 about here*** 
Table 2.5 reports the regression results of the VAR systems during the post-
market-liberalization period, from November 5, 2002 to September 30, 2007, based on 
three different model specifications. Again, the empirical results generated from 
different models are highly consistent. In line with H4, which predicts a decreased level 
of information asymmetry, I find no significant lead-lag relation between the A and B 
twin shares on either the SSE or the SZSE after market liberalization (columns 
Moreover, I find that the past returns of Shanghai A shares tend to lead their own stock 
movements and that the Shanghai A-share market becomes the most influential one after 
market restructuring. A close comparison between Tables 2.4 and 2.5 indicates a reduced 
level of lead-lag interdependence between the two markets, suggesting that the problem 
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of information asymmetry between foreign and domestic investors has been mitigated to 
a large extent since the structural segmentation was abrogated in China. In other words, 
investors in one market are now able to absorb information generated in the other market 
more quickly than before. 
***Insert Table 2.5 about here*** 
Figure 2.4 plots the stock movements of the A and B twin-share portfolios over 
time. As can be seen, there is a significant interrelation between local A and foreign B 
shares that are issued by the same companies. Additionally, the figures also indicate an 
increasing degree of contemporaneous cross-market synchronicity and a decreasing 
degree of lead-lag impact upon market liberalization. These findings suggest a reduced 
level of cross-market diversification benefits and improved market efficiency under 
increased market integration. 
***Insert Figure 2.4 about here*** 
2.4.2. Price Informativeness 
Table 2.6 reports the stock price synchronicity of the twin-share portfolios, sorted 
by exchange listing (SSE or SZSE) and time period of estimation. 
***Insert Table 2.6 about here*** 
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According to columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.6, the R-squared values are much lower 
among B shares than among A shares prior to market liberalization reforms (0.14 relative 
to 0.30 on the SSE, and 0.12 relative to 0.34 on the SZSE), suggesting that foreign B 
shares are more informative than their A-share counterparts under perfect market 
segmentation (H2 is supported). Consistent with the findings in Table 2.1, which 
document a significant B-share discount, columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.6 also show that 
foreign B shares tend to realize negative abnormal returns during the pre-market-
liberalization period. 
In addition, H3 predicts a positive relation between the magnitude of the discount 
and the capitalization of firm-specific information. As Table 2.1 shows, the price 
disparity between the two classes of stocks declines dramatically after the regulatory 
reforms (decreases from 9.86 to 3.80 on the SSE and drops from 8.94 to 2.93 on the 
SZSE). Consistent with the predictions of H3, Table 2.6 indicates that the divergence in 
price synchronicity also shrinks substantially upon market liberalization (the mean 
difference of the R-squared values declines from 0.16 to 0.05 on the SSE and drops from 
0.22 to 0.001 on the SZSE). 
Consistent with H4, which predicts a mitigated degree of information asymmetry 
across the two markets, columns 1 and 5 of Table 2.6 document a dramatic decline in 
price synchronicity among local A shares after the opening of the A-share market to 
foreign investors (the R-squared value decreases from 0.30 to 0.23 on the SSE and falls 
from 0.34 to 0.27 on the SZSE). This finding suggests that A share prices have become 
more informative since the market liberalization reforms in 2001 and 2002. However, a 
close comparison between columns 2 and 6 indicates more co-movement among B shares 
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after the opening of the B-share market to Chinese domestic investors (the R-squared 
value increases from 0.14 to 0.28 on the SSE and rises from 0.12 to 0.27 on the SZSE). 
Given that Chinese investors are accustomed to trading on market-wide information, one 
should expect more market-level (less firm-level) information to be incorporated into B-
share prices once Chinese investors are allowed to trade in the B-share market. Both 
effects mitigate the information asymmetry across the two markets. 
2.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This essay addresses the information asymmetry between the Chinese local A-
share and foreign B-share markets and its impact on the B-share discount puzzle, 
contingent upon the regulatory reforms of Chinese stock market liberalization in 2001 
and 2002. In contrast with the widespread belief that domestic investors are better 
informed than foreign investors, B-share investors are found to be more efficient in 
collecting and processing value-relevant, firm-specific information in an emerging 
environment such as China, where information transparency and investor protection are 
relatively weak. In particular, I find that under perfect market segmentation, the 
information tends to flow from foreign to domestic investors and that B-share prices are 
generally more informative than those of their A-share counterparts. As such, the 
observed B-share discount is not compensation for the informational disadvantage of 
foreign investors but, rather, the result of a downward price correction (toward the 
fundamental values of the stocks) once more firm-specific information is capitalized by 
sophisticated foreign investors. Further investigation indicates a mitigated degree of 
information asymmetry and B-share discount upon market liberalization. 
Despite these provocative findings, some caveats should be noted. First, the 
evidence of this study is based on a single-country analysis. It would be interesting to 
consider other emerging economies to determine the generalizability of the results. 
Second, while the empirical results of this study point to a possible explanation of the 
Chinese B-share discount puzzle, alternative reasons, such as the lack of alternative 
investment opportunities and the existence of speculative bubbles in China, cannot be 
safely ruled out without additional investigation. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study offers new and relatively robust 
insights into the literature. First, it addresses the ongoing debate over the issue of 
whether or not domestic investors are better informed than foreign investors in emerging 
markets. By analyzing the issue in a contingency framework (contingent on the 
institutional environment of a country), this essay offers a possible reconciliation to the 
conflicting empirical findings that have been plaguing the literature. Second, it points to 
another possible and more rational explanation of the Chinese foreign share discount 
puzzle. The argument is that with informed foreign investors and inherent stock 
misvaluation, the so-called B-share discount is mainly a result of a downward price 
correction effect once more firm-specific information is capitalized into stock prices. 
Finally, despite the overwhelming focus on the structural segmentation of the Chinese 
stock market, little, if any, attention has been paid to the dynamic pattern of the 
information asymmetry and B-share discount, taking into account the recent regulatory 
reforms in China. This study also bridges this gap. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CROSS-LISTING AND THE VALUE OF BONDING UNDER 
INCREASED MARKET INTEGRATION 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the literature of corporate finance, accounting information such as earnings has 
been documented to have a significant impact on a firm's stock market performance (e.g., 
Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 1998; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Collins, Maydew, 
and Weiss, 1997). However, the integrity of accounting information has long been 
questioned, and earnings management has been related to a variety of corporate events. 
Such events include initial public offerings (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong, 1998a), seasoned public offerings (e.g., Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 
1998b), mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Erickson and Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004), share 
repurchases (e.g., Brockman, Khurana, and Martin, 2008; Gong, Louis, and Sun, 2008), 
and compensation plans (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Cornett, Marcus, and 
Tehranian, 2008). 
Furthermore, earnings management tends to be more rampant in emerging than in 
developed capital markets (e.g., Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003). This tendency exists 
because, first, in an environment with limited investor protection, ineffective legal 
enforcement, and ill-functioning accounting-auditing systems, corporate managers 
generally have more discretion over their financial reporting processes. This obviously 
makes the manipulation of firm-specific information less costly in such environments. 
Second, the lack of investor protection and information transparency in emerging markets 
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also magnifies the benefits of private control, increases insiders' incentives to mask firm 
performance, and further promotes earnings management. Consequently, firms in weak 
institutional environments exhibit more earnings smoothing, a greater tendency to 
manage toward a target, a weaker association between accounting earnings and share 
prices, and a less timely recognition of losses (Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006). 
Extant literature has demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that the legal 
environment and the degree to which investors are protected in a country play an 
important role in restricting corporate misconduct and insiders' expropriation of minority 
shareholders (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). However, 
the development of the regulatory environment is not a firm-level choice, and it cannot be 
done overnight. Therefore, an effective countermeasure is for firms in weak institutional 
environments to cross-list on a more regulated capital market. This may voluntarily bond 
the firms to higher regulatory, disclosure, and monitoring standards, and, hence, mitigate 
potential agency costs and corporate misconduct, such as earnings management. This is 
often referred to as the "bonding hypothesis" (e.g., Coffee, 1999, 2002; Stulz, 1999). 
Despite strong theoretical supports, however, empirical evidence documenting the 
effectiveness of this kind of bonding commitment has been mixed. The literature is 
permeated with both positive (e.g., Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz, 2009; 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004; Reese and Weisbach, 2002) and negative or 
insignificant findings (e.g., Lang et al., 2006; Siegel, 2005). As Cantale (1996) and Moel 
(1999) point out, even though cross-listing has a positive impact on firm value, this may 
not necessarily be attributable to the bonding role of cross-listing; rather, it may simply 
be a signaling effect. Therefore, further research is needed to better understand whether 
firms are effectively "renting" the regulatory environment by cross-listing on a more 
regulated market. This study addresses the bonding impact of cross-listing on corporate 
behavior in the context of earnings management, stock price informativeness, and firm 
valuation. 
Moreover, an interesting and important question to address in today's increasingly 
integrated world is whether and to what extent the progressive globalization process and 
enhanced capital market integration affect the role of cross-listing. Theoretically, a 
necessary condition for the bonding hypothesis to sustain itself is the divergence in 
underlying investment environments across markets. In an increasingly integrated world 
where regulatory and disclosure requirements are more or less standardized globally, the 
bonding benefits of cross-listing may be mitigated to a large extent. Drawing on the 
unique opportunity of Chinese stock market restructuring, this study examines the 
changing role of cross-listing under increased market integration. 
China has been chosen as the research focus of this study for two reasons. First, 
despite the increasing importance of the Chinese capital market, empirical evidence to 
date has been rare and inconclusive in documenting the bonding impact of cross-listing 
on Chinese firms. For instance, Doidge et al. (2004) find that foreign companies with 
shares cross-listed in the United States are worth more relative to similar home country 
firms using data from 40 countries. Additionally, using data from 31 countries, Doidge et 
al. (2009) find that firms' decisions to list overseas involve a trade-off between private 
control and bonding benefits. However, China is excluded from both studies. Therefore, 
testing the generalizability of the bonding hypothesis for Chinese firms offers an 
important contribution to the literature. 
Second, while the issue of cross-listing has stimulated a considerable amount of 
quality research, a common limitation associated with these studies is that they tend to 
consider cross-listing impact within a static framework. The effect of globalization on 
the dynamics of cross-listing (and delisting) decisions is largely ignored. In an 
increasingly integrated world, observing a significant bonding impact is not the end of the 
story. A more relevant and important question to ask is whether and to what extent 
enhanced market integration erodes the bonding role of cross-listing. The structural 
segmentation and subsequent liberalization of the Chinese stock market provide us with 
an ideal laboratory for testing this issue. 
The remainder of this essay begins with a brief discussion of hypothesis 
development in Section 2. Data description and model specifications are presented in 
Section 3. Empirical results and concluding remarks are offered in Sections 4 and 5, 
respectively. 
3.2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The framework of this study is built upon the bonding hypothesis of cross-listing 
proposed by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999), the earnings management literature, 
the information-based interpretation of stock price synchronicity (e.g., Chan and Hameed, 
2006; Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000; Roll, 1988), and the structural segmentation and 
subsequent liberalization of the Chinese stock market. 
Before the market liberalization reforms in 2001 and 2002, Chinese domestic 
firms could issue two distinct classes of stocks, identical in all aspects except for their 
ownership restrictions: A shares, which could only be held and traded by domestic 
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investors, and B shares, which could only be held and traded by foreign investors. As a 
result, the Chinese stock market has been divided into two separate markets: the local A-
share market and the foreign B-share market. Owing to the regulatory segmentation of 
the Chinese stock market, Chinese domestic firms have an additional cross-listing choice 
besides listing overseas (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange or the London Stock 
Exchange). They may list on the foreign-based Chinese B-share market in addition to 
their domestic A-share listings. 
What makes the Chinese context interesting are the subsequent liberalization 
reforms, i.e., the opening of the foreign B-share market to Chinese domestic investors on 
February 19, 2001 and the opening of the domestic A-share market to qualified foreign 
institutional investors (QFII) on November 5, 2002. Thanks to the structural 
segmentation and recent regulatory reforms in China, one is allowed to test the impact of 
market integration within a relatively short time frame, where the structural stationarity 
and omitted-variables problems are of less serious modeling concern. 
Given that the primary objective of this study is to investigate the impact of 
market integration on the bonding role of cross-listing, I focus mainly on the B-share 
listings as the means of cross-listing in this study. Firms are henceforth defined as cross-
listed if they have B-share listings and non-cross-listed if they do not. 
3.2.1. The Bonding Hypothesis 
In the literature of international finance, conventional theories suggest that firms 
list overseas to lower their cost of capital through mitigated investment barriers, reduced 
risk exposure, enhanced liquidity, visibility, and investor base (e.g., Doukas and Switzer, 
2000; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Lins, Strickland, and Zenner, 2005; Miller, 1999; 
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Mittoo, 1992). While these hypotheses have had some success in explaining cross-listing 
practices, their empirical validity and saliency have long been questioned. Major 
criticisms stem from their failure to explain why firms continuously list overseas after the 
removal of investment barriers; why relatively few firms cross-list overseas, given the 
proposed benefits; and why the market reacts more positively if the firm chooses to cross-
list on major exchanges as opposed to over-the-counter (OTC) and private placements. 
Facing these difficulties of conventional theories in explaining cross-listing 
rationales, a variety of hypotheses have been developed, among which the most 
frequently cited is the bonding hypothesis proposed by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz 
(1999). In the context of the bonding hypothesis, firms cross-list on more regulated 
markets to voluntarily bond themselves to higher regulatory, disclosure, and monitoring 
standards so as to mitigate potential agency conflicts (e.g., Coffee, 1999, 2002; Reese and 
Weisbach, 2002; Stulz, 1999). Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, Doidge et al. 
(2004) find that cross-listing on a more regulated market (the U.S. market in particular) is 
an effective device in limiting controlling shareholders' expropriation of minority 
shareholders, and that foreign companies with shares cross-listed in the United States are 
worth more than similar home country firms. The major contribution of this hypothesis 
is that it resolves a current paradox concerning why a majority of firms do not cross-list. 
According to Doidge et al. (2009), a firm's decision to list overseas involves a trade-off 
between private control and bonding benefits. Because cross-listing reduces controlling 
shareholders' consumption of private benefits through both direct (e.g., more stringent 
disclosure and regulatory requirements) and indirect constraints (e.g., enhanced 
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monitoring by sophisticated foreign investors), for a firm to cross-list, the benefits of 
bonding must be large enough to offset controlling shareholders' losses in private control. 
While there is substantial evidence that the bonding consideration is one of the 
major determinants of a firm's listing decision, whether and to what extent cross-listing 
on a more regulated market effectively bonds real corporate behavior is still an open 
question. As Cantale (1996) and Moel (1999) point out, even though cross-listing has a 
positive impact on firm value, the observed listing benefits may not necessarily be 
attributable to the bonding role of cross-listing; rather, it may simply be a signaling effect. 
By cross-listing on a market with more stringent disclosure and regulatory requirements, 
a firm can signal the market that it is a high-quality firm, resulting in a higher valuation, 
even though no significant improvement in its corporate governance is made. Consistent 
with this argument, Siegel (2005) finds that U.S. listing is not a perfect substitute for a 
strong legal environment, nor does it serve as an effective bonding mechanism for 
deterring malfeasance. As such, it is the "reputational bonding" that explains the success 
of cross-listings. 
This ongoing debate calls for direct evidence of the impact of cross-listing on real 
corporate practices. On a theoretical basis, the key to validating the empirical 
effectiveness of the bonding hypothesis is to examine whether cross-listing has a real 
impact on corporate behavior. If the benefits are purely due to a signaling effect, then 
there should be little, if any, improvement in the listing firm's corporate governance 
and/or the information environment. This study addresses the bonding impact of cross-
listing on corporate behavior in the context of earnings quality, price informativeness, 
and firm valuation. 
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3.2.2. Earnings Management 
In the literature, a substantial body of research consistently documents a nontrivial 
association between accounting earnings and a firm's stock market performance (e.g., 
Barth et al., 1998; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Collins et al., 1997). Nevertheless, the 
integrity of corporate information has long been questioned, and earnings management 
has been related to a variety of corporate events (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Brockman et al., 2008; Cornett et al., 2008; Erickson 
and Wang, 1999; Gong et al., 2008; Louis, 2004; Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b). 
Furthermore, the manipulation of corporate information tends to thrive in emerging 
markets. Firms in such environments are found to exhibit more earnings smoothing, a 
greater tendency to manage toward a target, a weaker association between accounting 
earnings and share prices, and a less timely recognition of losses (Lang et al., 2006). This 
is not surprising because in an environment with limited investor protection, ineffective 
legal enforcement, and ill-functioning information infrastructure, investors have neither 
information transparency nor enforcement capability to prevent such managerial 
misconduct as earnings management. This imposes additional costs on firms in such 
environments. 
Based on the bonding hypothesis, it is often possible for firms in weak 
institutional environments to cross-list on a more regulated capital market to voluntarily 
bond themselves to higher regulatory, disclosure, and monitoring standards. By doing so, 
listing firms are committed to better information transparency, improved corporate 
governance, and limited expropriation of minority shareholders. 
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Since firms with foreign listings are bonded by a higher level of regulatory, 
disclosure, and monitoring standards, the integrity of their reported earnings should differ 
predictably from that of comparable purely domestic-listed firms. I base this argument 
on three aspects. First, the information disclosure requirement is stricter for firms with 
foreign B-share listings. In China, firms that issue shares to both domestic and foreign 
investors are required to prepare their financial statements based on both the Chinese 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), whereas firms that issue shares exclusively to domestic investors are 
subject solely to the Chinese GAAP. The increased financial reporting standard will, to a 
large extent, make the manipulation of firm-specific information more costly for firms 
with B-share listings. Second, under IAS requirements, the financial statements of cross-
listed firms must be audited by internationally authorized CPA firms, which are less 
likely to cooperate with local firms in manipulating their financial figures. Third, 
sophisticated foreign investors participating in the B-share market, especially institutional 
investors, often act as powerful external monitors guarding against corporate misconduct. 
Because firms with B-share listings bear higher market and regulatory costs for 
earnings management, one should expect those firms to exhibit better earnings quality 
than firms without B-share listings. 
Based on the above discussions, the following hypothesis is developed. 
HI: Firms with foreign B-share listings have better earnings quality than firms 
with only domestic A-share listings. 
3.2.3. Price Informativeness 
Given the hypothesized divergence in earnings quality between cross-listed and 
non-cross-listed firms, an interesting question to ask is whether this kind of bonding 
commitment and the resultant increase in earnings quality will be correctly incorporated 
into stock pricing and firm value. 
Drawing on state-of-the-art finance literature, this study uses price synchronicity 
to measure stock price informativeness. As Roll (1988) points out, the extent to which 
stocks move together depends on the relative amounts of firm-level and market-level 
information incorporated into stock prices. In the past two decades, a growing body of 
literature consistently provides empirical support to this information-based interpretation 
of stock synchronicity. For example, Morck et al. (2000) find that stock prices move 
together more in emerging markets, where reliable firm-specific information is either 
technically unavailable or prohibitively expensive. Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin 
(2003) indicate that the relationship between current returns and future earnings is 
stronger for firms and industries with low price synchronicity. Durnev, Morck, and 
Yeung (2004) document a positive association between the economic efficiency of 
corporate investment and the magnitude of firm-specific variation in stock returns. Jin 
and Myers (2006) find that stock price synchronicity decreases with the level of 
information transparency. Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010) note that foreign ownership and 
auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity and that the amount of firm-
level information reflected in stock prices is lower for firms with high synchronicity. 
These empirical findings point to a single story: higher firm-specific return variation (as a 
fraction of total variation) indicates more informative stock prices. 
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This can also be justified easily on conceptual grounds. Theoretically, this stream 
of research is developed upon a hypothesized decomposition of information in stock 
pricing. The idea is that if asset prices can be considered as a function of both firm-
specific and market-wide information, then in an environment with significant 
impediments to informed trading, investors will have to rely more on market-wide 
information, resulting in a higher degree of stock co-movement. On the other hand, in an 
environment with sufficient investor protection and information transparency, stock 
prices will tend to be less synchronous with each other due to informed trading. 
Despite this rather clear and strong theoretical ground, empirical evidence to date 
has been inconclusive in documenting the impact of cross-listing on stock price 
informativeness in emerging markets. For example, Gul et al. (2010) indicate that 
synchronicity is inversely associated with foreign ownership and auditor quality in an 
emerging market such as China. On the other hand, Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) find 
that cross-listing improves price informativeness in developed capital markets, but 
decreases price informativeness in emerging markets. Therefore, the true relationship 
between cross-listing and stock price informativeness in emerging markets merits further 
attention. This study offers more robust insights into this debate. 
Based on the bonding hypothesis, B-share prices should be more informative than 
their A-share counterparts. I justify this argument on three grounds. First, if listing on 
the B-share market indeed leads to better earnings quality, as proposed in this study, then 
the increased integrity of corporate information among cross-listed firms should 
ultimately promote informed trading and result in more value-relevant B-share prices. 
Second, because B-share listing imposes a higher level of disclosure and regulatory 
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requirements on listing firms, it will undoubtedly mitigate information asymmetry 
between corporate insiders and outsiders and lead to more informative stock prices. 
Third, foreign investors participating in the B-share market are often more sophisticated 
than Chinese domestic investors in collecting, processing, and analyzing value-relevant 
corporate information, which will further facilitate the capitalization of firm-specific 
information into stock prices. 
Based on the above discussions, the following hypothesis is derived. 
H2: Firms with foreign B-share listings have less synchronous (more informative) 
stock prices than firms with only domestic A-share listings. 
3.2.4. Firm Value 
To facilitate a more complete analysis, the impact of cross-listing on firm 
valuation is further investigated. If cross-listing indeed leads to better corporate 
governance, improved earnings quality, and more informative stock pricing, then firms 
that issue shares to both domestic and foreign investors should receive a higher market 
valuation than firms that issue shares exclusively to domestic investors. 
In the literature, a substantial body of research documents that cross-listing on a 
more regulated capital market is value enhancing. As noted by conventional theories, 
cross-listing provides firms with better access to global capital, reduced risk exposure, 
enhanced visibility, liquidity, and investor base. As such, cross-listed firms should have 
a lower cost of capital and a higher valuation in the marketplace. According to the 
bonding hypothesis, by cross-listing on a more regulated market, corporate insiders, or 
controlling shareholders, voluntarily bond themselves to increased disclosure, better 
corporate governance, and improved investor protection. If this is the case, then the 
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value of cross-listed firms should be higher. Both hypotheses predict a positive effect of 
cross-listing on firm value. 
Because the foreign B-share market is associated with more stringent regulatory, 
disclosure, and monitoring standards, and because cross-listed firms are committed to 
better corporate governance and enhanced information transparency, one should expect 
firms with B-share listings to receive a higher market valuation compared to their purely 
domestic-listed peers. Therefore, the following hypothesis is derived. 
H3: Firms with foreign B-share listings have a higher valuation than firms with 
only domestic A-share listings. 
3.2.5. Increased Market Integration 
Observing that cross-listing plays an important role in shaping corporate earnings 
management, price informativeness, and firm value, however, is not the end of the story 
in today's increasingly integrated world. A more relevant and important question to ask 
is whether and to what extent the ongoing processes of market integration will erode the 
bonding role o f cross-listing. On a theoretical basis, a necessary condition for the 
bonding hypothesis to be sustained is the divergence in underlying investment 
environments across markets. While it is unlikely for the processes of market integration 
to entirely invalidate the bonding role of cross-listing (Doidge et al., 2004), a diminishing 
impact is expected. First, as the disclosure and regulatory requirements around the world 
become more and more standardized, the bonding impact should be less prominent. 
Second, the power of external monitoring will be less divergent across different markets 
in a more integrated world since the investor base is more or less the same globally. 
Therefore, I hypothesize the following. 
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H4: The divergence in earnings quality, price informativeness, and firm value 
between the two groups of firms will be less evident after market integration. 
3.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1. Data Description 
This study uses panel data to control for potential survivorship bias and omitted-
variables problems. Since the purpose of this study is to compare the earnings quality, 
price informativeness, and firm value between firms with and without foreign B-share 
listings, I first construct a paired sample of cross-listed versus non-cross-listed firms. 
Note that due to the structural segmentation of the Chinese stock market, Chinese 
domestic firms have an additional cross-listing choice besides listing overseas; they may 
list on the foreign-based B-share market in addition to domestic A-share listings. To 
better understand the impact of market integration on the bonding role of cross-listing, I 
focus mainly on B-share listings as the means of cross-listing in this study. Firms are 
defined as cross-listed if they have B-share listings and non-cross-listed if they do not. 
This study investigates a panel sample of Chinese firms over a nine-year period, 
from 1998 to 2006. The sample period begins in 1998 because it is the year that publicly 
traded firms in China were formally required to release cash flow statements. The 
estimation time frame spans the two regulatory reforms, i.e., the opening of the B-share 
market to Chinese domestic investors on February 19, 2001 and the opening of the A-
share market to QFII on November 5, 2002. The time frame is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
***Insert Figure 3.1 about here*** 
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In this study, both firm-level accounting data and stock market figures are 
compiled from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database (CSMAR). 
Using balanced panel data, I further require the sample firms to be continuously listed on 
either the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
during the entire sample period. After eliminating firms with insufficient histories or 
missing values on related accounting items,2 companies with incomparable sizes (relative 
to cross-listed firms), enterprises in financial industries, and those with foreign listings 
other than B shares, there are 701 firms left. The final sample, therefore, consists of 67 
A- and B-share dual-listed firms and 634 comparable purely domestic A-share listed 
firms, each with a continuous listing history over the entire sample period. To control for 
potential industry effects, I further classify the sampled firms into six broadly defined 
industry categories in line with the CSMAR industry code A. 
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of the sample, sorted by exchange listing 
(SSE or SZSE), choice of B-share listings, and time period of estimation. The variables 
are defined as follows: SIZE is the size of the firm, calculated as the natural log of total 
assets; BM is the book-to-market ratio, measured as the difference between total assets 
and total liabilities, divided by the stock market capitalization of the firm; LEV is the 
leverage (debt-to-equity) ratio; SO is state ownership, measured as the percentage of 
common shares owned by the state; ROA is the return on assets (ROA), computed as 
EBXI divided by total assets; and Q is the Tobin's Q ratio, calculated as the book value 
of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by 
2 Related accounting items include total assets, total liabilities, total equity, earnings before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations (EBXI), cash flow from operations (CFO), sales revenues, receivables, 
and gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE). 
the book value of total assets (see, for example, McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Doidge et 
al., 2004; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). 
***Insert Table 3.1 about here*** 
According to columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.1, SSE-listed firms appear to have a 
higher book-to-market ratio (2.75 relative to 2.67), a lower leverage ratio (1.42 relative to 
2.02), a higher ROA ratio (11.1% relative to 8.8%), and a lower Q value (0.78 relative to 
1.55) than SZSE-listed firms. These figures suggest that SSE-listed firms tend to be more 
profitable in the marketplace, be more conservative in their financial decisions, and have 
fewer growth opportunities compared to SZSE-listed firms. Interestingly, these Chinese 
firms are found to have an unusually high book-to-market ratio (around 2.7 on average) 
during the sample period. One possible explanation for this is that Chinese firms are 
more reluctant to write down their assets. 
A close comparison between columns 4 and 5 indicates that firms with B-share 
listings generally have a higher book-to-market ratio than comparable purely domestic-
listed firms (2.80 relative to 2.70), suggesting that cross-listed firms tend to face fewer 
growth opportunities. In addition, cross-listed firms are found to have an average debt-
to-equity ratio that is much lower than that of non-cross-listed firms (1.03 relative to 
1.77), implying that cross-listed firms tend to rely more on equity financing. Moreover, 
state ownership appears to be lower among firms with foreign ownership than among 
purely domestic-listed firms (30.8% relative to 32.4%). The difference in government 
ownership between the two groups of firms suggests that purely domestic-listed firms are 
more likely to be influenced by government mandates, whereas cross-listed firms are 
more market driven. In addition, the ROA ratio is found to be much higher among cross-
listed firms than among non-cross-listed firms (11.9% relative to 9.8%), suggesting that 
firms with foreign B-share listings are generally more profitable in the marketplace. 
Consistent with the higher book-to-market ratio for cross-listed firms, Tobin's Q is much 
lower among firms with B-share listings than among purely domestic-listed firms (0.86 
relative to 1.17), implying that cross-listed firms tend to receive a lower market valuation, 
or face fewer growth opportunities than their home market peers. However, such a 
comparison must be viewed cautiously, given that non-cross-listed firms have a standard 
deviation that is 37 times higher than that of cross-listed firms. This abnormally high 
standard deviation implies significant variations among non-cross-listed firms. As such, 
the conclusion cannot be safely drawn without taking into account various firm- and 
industry-level characteristics. 
Across time periods (columns 6 and 7 of Table 3.1), the data display a clear 
tendency toward a reduced use of leverage (the average debt-to-equity ratio drops from 
2.07 to 1.48), mitigated state control (the average state ownership decreases from 33.9% 
to 31.3%), and increased firm value (the average Q ratio increases from 0.71 to 1.40) 
upon market liberalization. The findings suggest that Chinese firms tend to rely more on 
equity financing, be more market driven, and face better growth opportunities after 
market liberalization. All other variables experience marginal variations across different 
time periods. 
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3.3.2. Measuring Earnings Management 
In the literature, earnings management is generally investigated using two 
approaches. The first approach deduces earnings management from accounting 
information. Measures based on this approach are typically related to the level of 
accruals (e.g., Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Sloan, 1996). The second approach focuses on 
the association between earnings and stock returns (e.g., Francis and Schipper, 1999). 
This method extracts information about earnings from stock prices by assuming that the 
market is efficient. In this study, I use accounting measures to examine earnings 
management because of their widespread use in the extant literature and their established 
significant market effects (e.g., Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2004, 2005). 
Since there is no agreed-upon accounting measure of earnings management, this study 
evaluates earnings quality using two alternative proxies: the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals and accruals quality. 
The first measure used in this study is discretionary accruals. This proxy is based 
upon a natural decomposition of corporate earnings. In general, earnings consist of two 
components, CFO and accounting accruals. Accounting accruals can be farther separated 
into two parts: non-discretionary accruals (necessary accounting adjustments) and 
discretionary accruals (accruals subject to managerial discretion). Following Hribar and 
Collins (2002), I calculate total accruals using data from cash flow statements. 
Specifically, TAU = EBXIn - CFOu. To be consistent with the literature (e.g., Bartov, Gul, 
and Tsui, 2001; Cornett et al., 2008; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Yu, 2008), the 
modified Jones (1991) model is utilized to estimate discretionary accruals. 
Al 
First, I conduct the following cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions to estimate the coefficients ai, a.2, and as within each industry over the 
sample period from 1999 to 2006 (note that the observations of year 1998 are lost in 
calculating lagged values). Specifically, 
TA„ 1 AREV PPEit —-!L- = al + a2 - + «3 -+£„ (1) 
4,i-i A.t-i A,t-i 4,,-i 
where TA is measured by the difference between EBXI and CFO, AREV is the change in 
sales revenues, and PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment. All variables are scaled 
by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year to control for size effects. 
Next, the value of non-discretionary accruals, NDA, is calculated using the 
estimates of aj, a2, and as from model (1). Note that the change in account receivables, 
AREC, is included in the equation per the modified Jones model so as to capture the 
extent to which a change in sales is due to an aggressive recognition of questionable sales. 
Specifically, 
A7ri, 1 (AREVt -ARECU) PPE, NDAi,=al—-+a1± j 3 — ( 2 ) 
A,t-1 4,r-l A,t-1 
The difference between total and non-discretionary accruals is discretionary 
accruals. That is, DAj —NDAn • Because all variables are scaled by total assets, the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals is expressed as a percentage of the firm's lagged 
assets. Larger values of discretionary accruals indicate higher earnings management 
(lower earnings quality). Since managers may have incentives to both inflate (reflected 
by positive DA) and deflate (reflected by negative DA) corporate earnings, the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals is frequently used in the literature to capture earnings 
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management in both directions. In the context of this study, the first hypothesis predicts 
that the absolute value of discretionary accruals will be lower for cross-listed firms than 
for non-cross-listed firms. 
In the literature, another widely used measure of earnings management is accruals 
quality (e.g., Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis et al. 2005; Francis, Nanda and Olsson, 
2008). Accruals quality is often measured by the standard deviation of residuals from the 
model that regresses current accruals on the lagged, current, and future values of CFO, 
change in sales revenues, and gross PPE. Specifically, 
TAn CFOj M CFO, CFOil+l AREV„ PPEit 
=To + n +72 +h - r - + n +r5 ——+*„ (3) 
Accruals quality is the standard deviation of residuals from the regression in 
equation (3). That is, AQ =a(sjl). A higher standard deviation of residuals implies a 
lower accruals quality. In this study, the bonding hypothesis implies that the accruals 
quality of cross-listed firms will tend to be better than that of non-cross-listed firms. 
3.3.3. Cross-Listing and Earnings Management 
To achieve a more direct assessment of the cross-listing impact on earnings 
management, a series of multivariate regressions are conducted. In the regressions, 
alternative measures of earnings management are regressed on a cross-listing dummy, as 
well as a number of control variables that have been documented to have a nontrivial 
influence on earnings quality. Such controls include an exchange dummy, firm size, the 
book-to-market ratio, ROA, leverage, and state ownership. The control variables are 
3 To facilitate a more rigorous analysis, the regressions are also conducted with additional control variables. 
The results are not reported because these controls are never statistically significant across all model 
specifications and have no evident impact on the main results. Such variables include sales growth, 
industry concentration, firm age, board size, and board independence, where sales growth and industry 
concentration are used to control for demand conditions and product-cycle effects. 
chosen based on previous studies, data availability, and the nature of this study. 
Moreover, the regressions are conducted within each industry group to account for 
potential industry effects.4 Specifically, the following models are estimated: 
|Z)4,| =4, +\DCROSSu +A2DEXCHit +A3SIZEll +\BM„ +^ROAu +\LEVU +X,SOu +eu (4) 
AQ, =\+\DCROSSu +^DEXCHII +\SLZEtt +\BMa +^R04 +\LEVlt +A,SQ, +£„ (5) 
The dependent variable in the regressions is either the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, \DA\, or accruals quality, AQ, where \DA\ is calculated using the 
modified Jones (1991) model, and AQ is measured as the standard deviation of residuals 
from the model that regresses current accruals on the lagged, current, and future values of 
CFO, change in sales revenues, and gross PPE. The exogenous variables in the models 
are defined as follows: DCROSS is the cross-listing dummy, which takes the value of 1 
for firms with both A- and B-share listings and 0 for firms with only domestic A-share 
listings; DEXCH is the exchange dummy, where 1 stands for SSE-listed firms and 0 
stands for SZSE-listed firms; SIZE is the size of the firm; BM is the book-to-market ratio; 
ROA is the ROA ratio; LEV is the leverage (debt-to-equity) ratio; and SO is state 
ownership. Here, the book-to-market ratio and ROA are included to account for growth 
opportunity and profitability, respectively, and the leverage ratio and state ownership are 
used to control for the impact of capital structure and ownership structure, respectively. 
The inclusion of a series of control variables, however, can lead to the problem of 
multicollinearity. Therefore, a correlation test is further conducted to check for possible 
signs of collinearity. As Table 3.2 indicates, while there are a number of statistically 
significant relationships among explanatory variables, none of them exceeds r = 0.55. In 
4 As a robustness check, I also duplicate the regressions with industry dummies, where the results are 
statistically unaffected. 
addition to the correlation test, I also calculate the VIF statistics as a cross-check for this 
issue, where none of the statistics is greater than 2.0. Hence, the concern about 
multicollinearity does not appear to be warranted. 
***Insert Table 3.2 about here*** 
Since the purpose of these multivariate regressions is to investigate the cross-
listing impact on earnings management, the main variable of focus here is the cross-
listing dummy, DCROSS. If listing on the B-share market improves earnings quality 
substantially (as HI contends), then the coefficient estimates of DCROSS should be 
negative and statistically significant. To address the changing role of cross-listing upon 
market integration, the regressions are further conducted with respect to the pre- (1999— 
2001) and post-market-integration periods (2003-2006). If the impact of cross-listing is 
mitigated under increased market integration (as H4 contends), then the coefficient 
estimates of DCROSS should be less significant after market liberalization reforms. 
3.3.4. Cross-Listing and Price Informativeness 
In line with the literature (e.g., Chan and Hameed, 2006; Morck et al., 2000; Roll, 
1988), this study uses the R-squared value from the regression of the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) to measure the departure of firm-specific stock movements from the 
market. Since the omitted-variables problem is generally less of a serious concern for 
panel models than for cross-sectional models (because the past values of the variables in 
the panel will partly control for the effects of the missing variables), the Sharpe-Lintner-
Black model seems to be capable of testing this issue. 
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Note that in the literature many studies include industry returns in the regression 
(see, for example, Durnev et al., 2004; Gul et al., 2010; Roll, 1998). It is argued, 
however, that in studies that focus on emerging markets, the inclusion of industry returns 
as an additional independent variable might be problematic, because of the difficulties in 
disentangling the industry effect from the market and the fact that some industries are 
dominated by a few firms (e.g., Chan and Hameed, 2006). This study follows Chan and 
Hameed's approach.5 In particular, the following model is estimated: 
(Rlt-R't) = a+/](R1M-R1F)+£it (6) 
p 
where Ru is the stock return for each individual firm at time t, that is, Rjt =log(—!£-)*100; 
pM 
Rf is the market return at time t, that is, R™ = log(-^)*100; R^ is the risk-free rate 
Pi-1 
(China's monthly yield of the three-month household deposit interest rate) at time t; and /? 
is the covariance of the market return with the portfolio return divided by the variance of 
the market return. The R-squared values from equation (6) are then used to measure the 
departure of firm-specific movements from the market. Specifically, 
A!=l (?) 
According to the Hausman specification test, the one-way random effects model 
is utilized. This means that, in general, the residual consists of two parts, that is, 
su =u: +vit. For a more precise estimation, the error components model and generalized 
least squares (GLS) estimation are also applied. 
5 As a robustness check, additional models with industry returns are also investigated, where the results are 
statistically unaffected. 
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In testing the impact of cross-listing on the capitalization of firm-specific 
information, one needs to compare the price synchronicity between cross-listed and non-
cross-listed firms. If cross-listing plays an important role in inducing more informative 
stock prices, then firms with B-share listings should experience less synchronous stock 
movements than firms without, that is, R^ < R2NC. If the impact of cross-listing is less 
bonding under increased market integration, then the divergence in price informativeness 
between the two groups of firms should be less evident after market liberalization, as 
reflected by a convergence in regression R-squared values. 
To achieve a more direct assessment, the impact of cross-listing on price 
synchronicity is further investigated in a multivariate regression. The dependent variable 
R2 is price synchronicity, measured by SYNCH -Log(——) (see, for example, Chan and 
1—/c 
Hameed, 2006; Durnev et al., 2004; Morck et al., 2000). Logistic transformation is 
utilized because the R-squared value is undesirable for regression purposes (it is bounded 
between 0 and 1). Additionally, the transformed variable also possesses some useful 
R2 a1 features. That is, SYNCH = Log( -) = Log(--f) = Log(<r2m)-Log(a2e). Intuitively, a higher 
1 -R ae 
value of SYNCH indicates a greater power of market-wide variation, <j2m , relative to firm-
specific variation, cr2, in explaining stock performance. 
In addition to the control variables in models (4) and (5), trading volume is further 
included in the regression to account for the impact of the speed of price adjustments on 
price synchronicity. Because actively traded stocks may react to market information 
faster than infrequently traded stocks, the individual price movements of stocks with high 
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trading volume will tend to be more synchronous with the market, all else being equal 
(e.g., Chan and Hameed, 2006). In particular, the following model is estimated: 
SYNCH,, =\ +\DCRCSSit +\DEXCHII +A}SEZEII +\BMU +\LEVU +ArSQl +\VOit +£„ (8) 
The independent variables in the model include the cross-listing dummy, 
DCROSS; the exchange dummy, DEXCH; firm size, SIZE; the book-to-market ratio, BM; 
the ROA ratio, ROA; the leverage (debt-to-equity) ratio, LEV; state ownership, SO; and 
trading volume, VOL. In terms of hypothesis testing, if listing on the B-share market 
results in less synchronous stock movements (as H2 contends), then the coefficient 
estimates of DCROSS should be negative and statistically significant. If the impact of 
cross-listing on price synchronicity is less evident under increased market integration (as 
H4 contends), then the coefficient estimates of DCROSS should be less significant after 
the regulatory reforms. 
3.3.5. Cross-Listing and Firm Value 
Observing a significant divergence in earnings quality and price informativeness 
between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms, the next question to address is whether 
and to what extent the increased corporate governance and improved information 
environment will be correctly incorporated into firm valuation. This section investigates 
the impact of cross-listing on firm value. Following the literature, I measure the 
dependent variable, firm value, using Tobin's Q ratio, which is calculated as the book 
value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, 
divided by the book value of total assets (see, e.g., McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Doidge 
et al., 2004; Morck et al., 1988). Explanatory variables in the model include the cross-
listing dummy, DCROSS; the exchange dummy, DEXCH; firm size, SIZE; the price-to-
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earnings ratio, PE; the leverage ratio, LEV; and state ownership, SO. Given the special 
relationship between Tobin's Q and the book-to-market ratio, I use the price-to-earnings 
ratio in equation (9) to control for growth opportunity, which is measured as current stock 
price divided by the earnings per share figure. Again, the regression is conducted within 
each industry group to control for potential industry effects. Specifically, the following 
model is estimated: 
Q, =a+j31DCROSS„ +J32DEXCH„ +&SIZE,, +/34PE„ +&LEV„ +P6SO„ +su (9) 
If cross-listing results in higher valuation (as H3 contends), then the coefficient 
estimates of DCROSS should be positive and significant. If the impact on firm value is 
mitigated in a more integrated world (as H4 contends), then the coefficient estimates of 
DCROSS should be less significant during the post-market-integration period. 
3.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.4.1. Earnings Management 
Table 3.3 compares the magnitude of earnings management between cross-listed 
and non-cross-listed firms. Panel A is for the entire sample period and panel B breaks 
down into pre- and post-market-integration periods. 
***Insert Table 3.3 about here*** 
Panel A of Table 3.3 shows that, on the whole, both the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (about 10.3% of lagged assets) and the measure of accruals quality 
(about 7.7% of lagged assets) are much higher than those documented in previous studies 
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for developed capital markets (around 5% of lagged assets; see, e.g., Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006; Francis et al., 2005; Yu, 2008). This finding suggests that earnings 
management tends to thrive in emerging markets where regulatory and disclosure 
standards are relatively low and investor protection is weak. 
In line with HI, which postulates that cross-listed firms have better earnings 
quality, I find that earnings management is less prevalent among cross-listed firms than 
among non-cross-listed firms. The \DA \ and AQ values are 9.7% and 6.7%, respectively, 
for firms with B-share listings (panel A, column 5), whereas they are 10.3% and 7.7%, 
respectively, for firms with only domestic A-share listings (panel A, column 6). The 
mean difference is 0.67% for the |DA | measure and 0.97% for the AQ measure. Both are 
statistically significant. 
In addition, the empirical findings in panel B of Table 3.3 are highly consistent 
with H4, which predicts a diminishing role of cross-listing under increased market 
integration. During the pre-market-integration period, both \DA\ and AQ are much lower 
for cross-listed firms than for non-cross-listed firms (7.9% relative to 10.4% with respect 
to \DA\, and 5.8% relative to 7.6% with respect to AQ). The mean difference is 
significant at the 1% level for both measures. After liberalization reforms, however, the 
divergence becomes statistically insignificant for the \DA\ measure (the mean difference 
shrinks from 2.5% to 0.2%) and marginally significant for the AQ measure (the mean 
difference declines from 1.8% to 0.2%). 
Overall, the results provide preliminary evidence that firms with B-share listings 
tend to have better earnings quality than their purely domestic-listed peers, while the 
quality differential between the two groups of firms becomes less evident in a more 
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integrated world. A year-by-year analysis of earnings management in Table 3.4 provides 
additional support for this central argument. As Table 3.4 indicates, the divergence in 
earnings quality between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms is highly significant 
prior to the initialization of market liberalization in 2001, whereas the difference fades 
away after the completion of the regulatory reforms in 2002. 
***Insert Table 3.4 about here*** 
The pattern of earnings management for the two groups of firms is presented 
graphically in Figure 3.2. As can been seen, both the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals, \DA\, and accruals quality, AQ, are much lower for cross-listed firms than for 
non-cross-listed firms during the pre-market-integration period, f rom 1999 to 2001. 
Additionally, there is a clear convergence in earnings quality between the two groups of 
firms during the post-market-integration period, from 2002 to 2006. 
* * *Insert Figure 3.2 about here * * * 
Table 3.5 presents the regression results regarding the impact of cross-listing on 
earnings management, where the dependent variable is either \DA\ (columns 1-3) or AQ 
(columns 4-6). Consistent with the empirical results reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the 
cross-listing dummy is significantly negative during both the full sample period and the 
pre-market-integration period for both earnings management measures. It becomes 
statistically insignificant during the post-market-integration period. 
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***Insert Table 3.5 about here*** 
The empirical results thus far document a consistent pattern: cross-listed firms 
manage earnings less than their purely domestic-listed peers, while the divergence 
between the two groups of firms becomes less evident in a more integrated world. 
3.4.2. Price Informativeness 
In line with the literature, this study uses the R-squared value from the regression 
of the CAPM to measure the departure of firm-specific stock movements from the market, 
and, hence, the capitalization of firm-specific information. The regression results are 
reported in Table 3.6, where columns 1 and 2 focus on the full sample period, and 
columns 3-6 break down into pre- and post-market-integration periods. As columns 1 
and 2 show, firms with B-share listings tend to move in a relatively unsynchronized 
manner compared to their purely domestic-listed peers (with the R-squared value of 0.37 
relative to 0.42), implying that B-share listing promotes the capitalization of firm-specific 
information. Further investigation indicates that there is a significant divergence in price 
synchronicity between the two groups of firms under perfect market segmentation (the R-
squared value is 0.33 for firms with B-share listings and 0.53 for firms without), whereas 
the difference shrinks dramatically after market integration (the R-squared value is 0.29 
for firms with B-share listings and 0.38 for firms without). The mean difference declines 
from 0.20 to 0.09. 
***Insert Table 3.6 about here*** 
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For a direct analysis of the impact of cross-listing on price informativeness, a 
multivariate regression is further conducted. The regression results are reported in Table 
3.7, where columns 1 and 2 focus on the full sample period, and columns 3-6 break down 
into pre- and post-market-integration periods. Consistent with the findings in Table 3.6, 
the coefficient estimates of DCROSS are negative and significant across all model 
specifications. In terms of control variables, I find that firm size, the book-to-market 
ratio, and state ownership tend to have a positive and significant impact on price 
synchronicity, suggesting that larger firms, state-owned enterprise, and companies with 
better growth opportunities are more likely to co-move with the market, or dominate the 
movements of the market. In addition, SSE-listed firms appear to have less synchronous 
stock movements than SZSE-listed firms. In contrast with the findings of Chan and 
Hameed (2006), trading volume is found to be insignificant during both the full and the 
post-market-linearization periods, and it is marginally significant during the pre-market-
linearization period. One possible explanation is that firm size and trading volume are 
highly correlated, and firm size subsumes trading volume in explaining synchronicity. 
***Insert Table 3.7 about here*** 
Overall, the results indicate that firms with B-share listings are valued more on 
firm-specific information, whereas firms with only domestic A-share listings are valued 
more on market-wide information. This is probably due to the distinct disclosure and 
regulatory standards and the participation of foreign investors in the B-share market. 
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These findings provide strong support to the bonding hypothesis, indicating that cross-
listing indeed en courages i nformed trading and facilitates the capitalization of firm-
specific information. The effect remains significant after market integration. 
3.4.3. Firm Value 
Table 3.8 reports the regression results regarding the impact of cross-listing on 
firm value (as measured by Tobin's Q). Columns 1 and 2 focus on the full sample period, 
columns 3 and 4 consider the pre-market-integration period, and columns 5 and 6 
examine the post-market-integration period. 
***Insert Table 3.8 about here*** 
Consistent with H3, which predicts a positive impact of cross-listing on firm 
value, the coefficient estimates of DCROSS are found to be positive and highly 
significant (at the 1% level) during both the full and pre-market-integration periods, 
suggesting that B-share listing is value-enhancing. This result is consistent with the main 
findings of Doidge et al. (2004), which indicate that firms cross-listed in the United 
States have an average Tobin's Q ratio that is 16.5% higher than that of their home 
country peers. In line with H4, which predicts a diminishing role of cross-listing under 
increased market integration, the statistical significance of DCROSS changes from 1% to 
5% in the post-market-integration period.6 The documented valuation premiums suggest 
6 Given the continued significance of DCROSS after market integration, a natural question to ask is whether 
or not this remaining positive impact of cross-listing is due to growth opportunity. To address this concern, 
I repeat the regression with an additional interaction term between cross-listing and the price-to-earnings 
ratio. The results are not reported, because the interaction term is neither statistically significant nor does it 
have any impact on the main findings. This suggests that the positive link between cross-listing and firm 
value is not driven by growth opportunity. 
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that Chinese investors do not adjust their valuations based on cross-listed firms when 
investing in similar purely domestic-listed firms. Additionally, what is remarkable here 
is that the valuation premiums remain significant even after the liberalization reforms, 
suggesting that domestic and cross-listed stocks are determined by different forces in 
China and that there is a lack of attention among investors. 
To sum up, the empirical results in this study suggest that cross-listing on a more 
regulated market leads to better corporate governance, improved information 
environment, and enhanced firm valuation, while the impact is less prominent in a more 
integrated world. 
3.4.4. Robustness Check for Endogeneity 
Despite these provocative findings, some caveats should be noted. An inevitable 
empirical challenge associated with studies that assess strategy performance is 
endogeneity (or simultaneous bias). With the potential self-selection problem, observing 
a positive relationship between cross-listing and earnings quality does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that cross-listing results in better earnings quality. The positive 
link between the two variables may be attributable to the fact that firms with better 
corporate governance (less earnings manipulation) are more likely to cross-list on a more 
regulated capital market. Likewise, the positive association between cross-listing and 
price informativeness (or firm value) may be attributable to the fact that firms with better 
corporate transparency (or better growth opportunities) are more likely to cross-list. 
A convenient way to address this causality issue is to compare the earnings 
quality of cross-listed firms before and after their B-share listings, while keeping all the 
other variables constant. However, the limited history of the Chinese stock market and 
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the tendency of Chinese firms to engage in domestic and foreign listings simultaneously 
have prevented us from obtaining sufficient pre-cross-listing observations. In the 
literature, another popular method to address this issue is to use instrumental variables. 
Nevertheless, given that both cross-listing decisions and earnings management practices 
remain largely unexplored in emerging economies, the construction of instrumental 
variables seems to be very subjective. This leaves the use of lagged dependent variables 
as the best choice for this study. Therefore, I re-estimate equations (4) and (5) with 
lagged dependent variables. Specifically, the following models are estimated: 
\D4,\ =4, +\DCROSS„ +A2EEKHjl +^SZZE; +\BMn +2.ROA,, +\LEV„ +A,SO„ +\DA,,_X +eit (10) 
AQ, +\DCROSSu +A2DEXCHi, +AiSIZEil +\BM„ +A.R04, +\LEV„ +A,SQ, +\AQ,_, +eu (11) 
Table 3.9 provides additional confidence concerning endogeneity, since the 
inclusion of lagged dependent variables does not change the statistic significance of 
DCROSS, nor does it have any significant influence on any other variables.7 
***Insert Table 3.9 about here*** 
3.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study examines the changing role of cross-listing in shaping corporate 
earnings management, stock price informativeness, and firm valuation under increased 
market integration. Using a panel sample of Chinese firms over a nine-year period from 
1998 to 2006,1 find that cross-listing has a significant positive impact on earnings quality. 
7 The same technique is applied to the models regarding the impact of cross-listing on price synchronicity 
and firm value. The results are highly consistent with the findings in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, indicating that our 
empirical design is relatively immune to the problem of endogeneity. 
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Consistent with the findings on earnings management, firms with B-share listings are 
found to have more informative stock pricing (as measured by price synchronicity) and 
higher valuation (as measured by Tobin's Q) than comparable purely domestic-listed 
firms. Further investigation indicates a reduced level of divergence between the two 
groups of firms upon market integration. Overall, the results suggest that cross-listing 
plays a significant but diminishing bonding role in an increasingly integrated world. The 
results are robust using various earnings management measures and different model 
specifications. 
Despite the interesting findings, some caveats should be noted. First, the 
evidence of this study is based on a single-country analysis. It would be rewarding to 
consider other emerging economies that undergo similar market liberalization processes 
to determine the generalizability of the results. Second, while the mitigated bonding role 
of cross-listing under increased market integration points to a possible explanation for the 
worldwide foreign delisting wave, alternative reasons, such as increased regulatory 
requirements, cannot be safely ruled out without additional investigation. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study offers new and relatively robust 
insights into the literature. First, while the bonding hypothesis has been researched 
significantly, little attention has been paid to directly testing the effectiveness of this kind 
of commitment in bonding real corporate practices. This study examines the bonding 
impact of cross-listing on corporate behavior in the context of earnings management, 
stock price informativeness, and firm valuation. 
Second, while the issue of cross-listing has stimulated a considerable amount of 
quality research, a common limitation associated with these studies is that they tend to 
consider cross-listing impact in a static framework. The effect of increased market 
integration on the dynamics of cross-listing (and delisting) decisions is largely ignored. 
Drawing on the unique opportunity of the Chinese stock market restructuring in 2001 and 
2002, this essay effectively addresses the changing role of cross-listing under increased 
market integration within a relatively short time frame, where structural stationarity and 
omitted-variables problems are of less serious modeling concern. 
Third, while the issues of earnings management, price informativeness, cross-
listing, and market liberalization have been objects of focus in modern finance literature, 
no systematic attempt to date has been made to address these issues in an integrated 
framework. By investigating the impact of cross-listing on corporate earnings quality, 
price informativeness, and firm valuation, contingent upon the regulatory reforms of 
Chinese stock market liberalization, this study provides a meaningful synthesis of these 
disparate research streams. The empirical findings of this essay also point to a possible 
explanation for the current worldwide foreign delisting wave that has been plaguing 
major stock exchanges. 
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CHAPTER 4 
U.S. LISTING, STOCK MISVALUATION, AND THE CONTENT OF 
INFORMATION IN STOCK PRICING 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades, the issue of international listings has been one of the 
primary focuses in modern finance literature. Previous studies have provided an 
extensive theoretical ground for expecting significant and long-lasting cross-listing 
premiums, that is, superior (abnormal) returns enjoyed by cross-listed firms on their 
home markets relative to comparable purely domestic-listed firms. This is especially true 
for firms that cross-list on more advanced capital markets. 
Conventional theories suggest that firms list overseas to overcome investment 
barriers and to lower their cost of capital. Because international listings provide firms 
with improved access to global capital, reduced risk exposure, enhanced visibility, 
liquidity and investor base, the cost of capital will be lower for cross-listed firms than for 
non-cross-listed firms (e.g., Doukas and Switzer, 2000; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Lins, 
Strickland, and Zenner, 2005; Miller, 1999; Mittoo, 1992). While these hypotheses have 
had some success in explaining cross-listing practices, their empirical validity and 
saliency have long been questioned. Major criticisms stem from their failure to explain 
why firms continuously list overseas after the removal of investment barriers; why 
relatively few firms cross-list overseas, given the proposed benefits; and why the market 
reacts more positively if the firm chooses to list on major exchanges as opposed to over-
the-counter (OTC) and private placements. 
Facing these difficulties of conventional theories in explaining cross-listing 
rationales, a variety of hypotheses have been developed, among which the most 
frequently cited is the bonding hypothesis proposed by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz 
(1999). In the context of the bonding hypothesis, firms cross-list on more regulated 
markets to voluntarily bond themselves to higher regulatory, disclosure, and monitoring 
standards so as to mitigate potential agency conflicts (e.g., Coffee, 1999, 2002; Karolyi, 
1998; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Stulz, 1999). Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) find that U.S. listing is an effective device in limiting 
controlling shareholders' expropriation of minority shareholders and that firms with 
shares cross-listed in the United States are worth more than similar home country firms. 
The major contribution of this hypothesis is that it resolves a current paradox concerning 
why a majority of firms do not cross-list. According to Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, 
and Stulz (2009), a firm's decision to list overseas involves a trade-off between private 
control and bonding benefits. Because cross-listing reduces controlling shareholders' 
consumption of private benefits, for a firm to cross-list, the benefits of bonding must be 
large enough to offset controlling shareholders' losses in private control. 
Moreover, it is argued that cross-listing on advanced markets with stricter 
disclosure requirements is an effective device in mitigating information asymmetry 
between corporate insiders and outsiders (e.g., Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva, 2006; Fuerst, 
1998; Moel, 1999). Empirically, international listings are found to be related to higher 
analyst coverage, improved forecast accuracy, and a more transparent information 
environment (e.g., Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver, 2002; Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2003). 
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Despite these rather clear and strong theoretical grounds, empirical evidence to 
date has been inconclusive in documenting the benefits of international listings. The 
literature is permeated by both positive (e.g. Doidge et al., 2004; Doukas and Switzer, 
2000; Miller 1999) and negative or insignificant findings (e.g. Alexander, Eun, and 
Janakiramanan, 1998; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Foerster and Karolyi, 1993). The 
failure of cross-listing research to demonstrate consistent findings has raised the question 
of whether existing theories are incomplete or contingent in explaining cross-listing 
practices. By addressing cross-listing issues in a contingency framework (contingent on 
the unique environment of a listing firm's home market), this essay offers a possible 
reconciliation to the conflicting empirical findings that have been plaguing the literature. 
As this study indicates, in an environment filled with severe information asymmetry and 
stock overvaluation, as is found in China, the presence of cross-listing premiums depends 
on the relative power of two distinct effects, i.e., the cross-listing benefits and the 
downward price correction (toward the fundamental values of the stocks). If U.S. listing 
indeed plays an important role in cultivating information transparency and more value-
relevant stock pricing, as proposed in the literature, then it should undoubtedly induce 
more accurate stock valuation. With inherent stock overvaluation, therefore, cross-listing 
premiums will exist if and only if listing benefits dominate the downward price pressure. 
The empirical investigation is conducted using a panel sample of Chinese firms 
with and without U.S. listings over a three-year period, from October 2004 to September 
2007. China has been chosen as the research focus of this study for two reasons. First, 
interest in understanding the Chinese capital market has grown commensurately with 
China's economic development and its increased integration with the world economy. 
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Nevertheless, empirical evidence to date has been rare and inconclusive in documenting 
the impact of cross-listing on Chinese firms. For example, using data from 40 countries, 
Doidge et al. (2004) find that foreign companies with shares cross-listed in the United 
States are worth more than similar home country firms; using data from 31 countries, 
Doidge et al. (2009) find that firms' decisions to cross-list involve a trade-off between 
private control and bonding benefits. However, China is excluded from both studies. 
Therefore, testing the generalizability of existing theories to the Chinese stock market 
offers an important building block to the literature. 
Second, the unique features of the Chinese stock market provide an ideal 
laboratory for testing the impact of cross-listing on home country information asymmetry 
and stock misvaluation. With limited investor protection, ineffective legal enforcement, 
and ill-functioning information infrastructure, investors have neither information 
transparency nor the ability to value a firm or a stock accurately. Stock misvaluation 
presents itself in such an environment with severe information asymmetry. In China, 
investors are frequently regarded as speculators who trade on rumors rather than 
informed investors who trade on fundamentals (e.g., Ma, 1996; Mei, Scheinkman, and 
Xiong, 2003), and the stock movements are found to be highly synchronous with the 
movements of the market rather than reflecting firm-specific information (e.g., Chan and 
Hameed, 2006; Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000). As a consequence, Chinese local shares 
are found to be universally overvalued relative to their fundamentals (e.g., Bailey and 
Jagtiani, 1994; Fernald and Rogers, 2002; Ma, 1996; Mei et al., 2003). This unique 
environment offers a natural platform for testing the impact of U.S. listing on stock 
misvaluation. 
The remainder of this essay proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a brief 
discussion on hypothesis development. Section 3 provides data description and model 
specifications. Empirical results are reported in Section 4, followed by concluding 
remarks in Section 5. 
4.2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
4.2.1. U.S. Listing and Price Correction 
In order to get an in-depth analysis of the cross-listing impact on Chinese firms, it 
is important to understand two idiosyncratic features of the Chinese stock market. First, 
stocks are universally overvalued relative to their fundamentals in China. Some 
researchers argue that it is the lack of alternatives to low-yielding bank accounts that 
drives Chinese domestic savings into the stock market and pushes stock prices up, 
beyond parity (e.g., Bailey and Jagtiani, 1994; Fernald and Rogers, 2002). Some 
researchers point out that it is the highly risk-tolerant and speculative behavior of Chinese 
investors that ultimately leads to the deviation of stock prices from a rational level (e.g., 
Ma, 1996; Mei et al., 2003). Because the objective of this study is to explore the impact 
of U.S. listing on stock misvaluation, what caused the overvaluation in the first place is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
The second idiosyncrasy associated with the Chinese stock market is that the 
movements of stocks are highly synchronous with the movements of the market, rather 
than reflecting firm-specific information (e.g., Chan and Hameed, 2006; Morck et al., 
2000). A worldwide comparison of stock price synchronicity placed China the second 
highest among 40 sample countries (Morck et al., 2000). This phenomenon can be well 
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explained by an information-based interpretation of stock price synchronicity proposed 
by Roll (1988). The idea is that if asset prices can be considered as a function of both 
firm-specific and market-wide information, then investors will have to rely more on 
market-wide information in an environment where reliable firm-specific information is 
either technically unavailable or prohibitively costly, resulting in highly synchronous 
stock movements. 
Given the inherent information asymmetry and stock misvaluation, U.S. listing 
will affect Chinese firms in two dimensions. On the one hand, there are numerous cross-
listing benefits. As proposed by conventional theories, cross-listing provides firms with 
improved access to global capital, reduced risk exposure, enhanced visibility, liquidity, 
and investor base, resulting in a lower cost of capital. Additionally, as the bonding 
hypothesis contends, because cross-listing on a more regulated market is an effective 
device in bonding corporate insiders and mitigating agency conflicts, cross-listed firms 
should have better corporate governance, more transparent information environment, and 
a higher valuation than their home country peers. Both hypotheses predict a significant 
cross-listing premium. On the other hand, it is argued that cross-listing plays an 
important role in mitigating information asymmetry in the marketplace (e.g., Bailey et al., 
2006; Baker et al., 2002; Fuerst, 1998; Lang et al., 2003; Moel, 1999). If this is the case, 
then there will be an inevitable downward price correction (toward the fundamental 
values of the stocks) in addition to whatever the benefits are when these overvalued 
Chinese firms list in the U.S. 
Therefore, in an environment filled with severe information asymmetry and stock 
misvaluation, such as China, the presence of cross-listing premiums depends on the 
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relative power of two distinct effects, i.e., the cross-listing benefits and the price 
correction effect. Premiums will exist if and only if listing benefits dominate the 
downward price pressure. In terms of hypothesis testing, this implies that stock prices of 
cross-listed firms should be more informative and less overvalued (as reflected by lower 
risk-adjusted abnormal returns) than those of purely domestic-listed firms. 
Based on the above discussions, the following hypothesis is developed. 
HI: Firms with U.S. listings are less overvalued (as reflected by lower risk-
adjusted abnormal returns) than comparable home country firms. 
4.2.2. Price Synchronicity 
Drawing on state-of-the-art finance literature, this study uses price synchronicity 
to measure stock price informativeness. As Roll (1988) points out, the extent to which 
stocks move together depends on the relative amounts of firm-level and market-level 
information incorporated into stock prices. In the past two decades, a growing body of 
literature consistently provides empirical support to this information-based interpretation 
of stock synchronicity. For example, Morck et al. (2000) find that stock prices move 
together more in emerging markets, where reliable firm-specific information is either 
technically unavailable or prohibitively costly. Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin 
(2003) indicate that the relationship between current returns and future earnings is 
stronger for firms and industries with low price synchronicity. Durnev, Morck, and 
Yeung (2004) document a positive association between the economic efficiency of 
corporate investment and the magnitude of firm-specific variation in stock returns. Jin 
and Myers (2006) find that stock price synchronicity decreases with the level of 
information transparency. Gul, Kim, and Qiu (2010) note that foreign ownership and 
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auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity, and that the amount of firm-
level information reflected in stock prices is lower for firms with high synchronicity. 
These empirical findings point to a single story: higher firm-specific return variation (as a 
fraction of total variation) indicates more informative stock prices. 
This can also be justified easily on conceptual grounds. Theoretically, this stream 
of research is developed upon a hypothesized decomposition of information in stock 
pricing. The idea is that if asset prices can be considered as a function of both firm-
specific and market-wide information, then in an environment with significant 
impediments to informed trading, investors will have to rely more on market-wide 
information, resulting in a higher degree of stock co-movement. On the other hand, in an 
environment with sufficient investor protection and information transparency, stock 
prices will tend to be less synchronous with each other due to informed trading. 
In the context of this study, the price correction hypothesis implies that stock 
prices of cross-listed firms should be more informative (less synchronous) than those of 
non-cross-listed firms. Therefore, the following hypothesis is derived. 
H2: Firms with U.S. listings tend to have less synchronous stock movements than 
comparable home country firms. 
4.2.3. Price-Earnings Relationship 
Nevertheless, the empirical validity of price synchronicity as a measure of the 
capitalization of firm-specific information has been challenged by some recent studies 
(e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Gassen, and LaFond, 2005). For a more rigorous analysis, I 
perform an additional test in this section to see whether the synchronicity measure 
captures the amount of firm-specific information that is incorporated into stock prices. 
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Standing at the core of various firm-level information, accounting earnings 
obviously play an important role in predicting a firm's stock market performance (e.g., 
Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 1998; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Collins, Maydew, 
and Weiss, 1997). The positive association between earnings and stock performance 
rests on strong conceptual grounds. In a standard valuation model with no market 
impediments, stock prices should reflect the discounted present value of all expected 
future cash flows. Therefore, there will be a strong relationship between corporate 
earnings and stock prices (or returns) if the market is efficient in inducing informative, 
value-relevant stock prices. This study uses the price-earnings relationship as a cross-
check measure of the capitalization of firm-specific information. 
In the literature, the relationship between accounting earnings and stock prices (or 
returns) is generally investigated through either an event study approach or an association 
approach. Event studies focus on exploring short-term stock market responses to 
earnings announcements. In association types of studies, however, returns measured over 
long time periods (e.g., a fiscal year) are regressed on current earnings or unexpected 
earnings to examine the price-earnings relationship. Both approaches are developed 
upon a standard valuation model in which unbiased stock price reflects the discounted 
present value of expected future cash flows. 
Because of data availability issues, this study investigates the price-earnings 
association to address the capitalization of earnings information into stock prices. In the 
context of this study, the price correction hypothesis implies that the price-earnings 
relationship should be stronger among cross-listed firms than among non-cross-listed 
firms. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed. 
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H3: The price-earnings relationship is stronger among firms with U.S. listings 
than comparable home country firms. 
4.2.4. Exchange vs. Non-Exchange Listings 
In the literature, a number of studies suggest a varying degree of cross-listing 
benefits, depending on the exchange choice of U.S. listings (e.g., Doidge et al., 2004; 
Doukas and Switzer, 2000; Miller, 1999). Because the sample encompasses both 
exchange-based (i.e., NYSE) and non-exchange-based (i.e., OTC and private placements) 
U.S. listings, I further examine the impact of listing choices on the magnitude of price 
correction. Because the regulatory and disclosure standards are more stringent for 
exchange listings (requiring full SEC disclosure and full reconciliation with the U.S. 
GAAP) than for OTC listings and private placements (requiring minimal SEC disclosure 
and no GAAP compliance), the listing impact on exchange-listed firms should be more 
prominent. If this is the case, then exchange listings should result in better information 
environment, more significant price correction, and less overvalued stock prices. 
In terms of hypothesis testing, this implies that NYSE-listed firms should exhibit 
a lower level of price synchronicity, stronger price-earnings relationship, and more 
accurate stock valuation (as reflected by lower risk-adjusted abnormal returns) relative to 
firms that choose OTC listings and private placements. 
Based on the above discussions, I hypothesize the following. 
H4: Stock prices are more informative and less overvalued among NYSE-listed 
firms than among firms that choose OTC listings and private placements. 
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4.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1. Data Description 
Given that a majority of Chinese firms list in the U.S. via American Depositary 
Receipt (ADR), this study focuses mainly on the ADRs as the means of U.S. listing. 
Each ADR is issued by a U.S. depositary bank and can represent a fraction or a multiple 
of a foreign share. Listing firms have a choice of four types of ADRs: three levels of 
public offerings as well as private placements (Rule 144A). Firms that list on major 
exchanges, such as NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, are required to fully reconcile their 
financial statements to the U.S. GAAP and release material corporate information based 
on SEC disclosure rules. On the other hand, firms that choose OTC listings (Level I 
ADRs) and private placements (Rule 144A) are subject to little, if any, SEC disclosure 
and no GAAP compliance. This distinct feature offers a natural platform for testing the 
price correction effect, contingent upon different listing standards. 
This study uses panel data to control for potential survivorship bias and omitted-
variables problems. Since the purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of U.S. 
listing on Chinese firms, I first identify 91 Chinese ADRs (as documented by the Bank of 
New York in September 2007). Using balanced panel data, I further require the sample 
firms to be continuously listed on both the Chinese domestic A-share market and the U.S. 
market for at least three years, from October 2004 to September 2007. The sample 
period is chosen based on a tradeoff between sample size and the length of the time 
period. After eliminating firms with insufficient cross-listing histories, companies with 
missing values on related items, and those in financial industries, there are 27 firms left. 
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The final sample, therefore, consists of 27 U.S. listed firms (8 NYSE listings and 19 OTC 
listings and private placements), each with a continuous cross-listing history over the 
entire sample period. 
Table 4.1 provides a brief description of the listed firms. An interesting feature of 
this sample is that, in addition to U.S. listings, these Chinese firms tend to cross-list 
simultaneously on some other Asian markets, such as the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
o 
and the Chinese B-share market. Additionally, some firms even list on the foreign-based 
Asian markets prior to their domestic listings, that is, they may list on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange or the B-share market first, followed by U.S. listings, and then domestic 
A-share listings. One possible explanation is that these firms regard the Chinese 
domestic A-share market as more risky than the relatively regulated Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange and the foreign-based B-share market. 
***Insert Table 4.1 about here*** 
Based on the characteristics of these 27 cross-listed firms, I then construct a 
matched sample of purely domestic-listed firms, which are matched in terms of both 
industry and firm size. After eliminating firms with insufficient histories or missing 
values, companies with incomparable sizes or unmatched industry categories, and those 
with any type of foreign listings, 816 comparable purely domestic-listed firms are 
identified, each with a continuous domestic listing history over the entire sample period. 
8 Prior to Chinese stock market liberalization in 2001, Chinese domestic firms could issue two distinct 
classes of stocks, identical in all aspects except for their ownership restrictions: A shares, which could only 
be held and traded by domestic investors, and B shares, which could only be held and traded by foreign 
investors. As a result, the Chinese stock market has been divided into two separate markets: the domestic 
A-share market and the foreign B-share market. 
In this study, both firm-level accounting data and stock market figures are 
compiled from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). 
Following the literature, I use China's monthly yield of the three-month household 
deposit interest rate as a proxy for the risk-free rate, which is compiled from the People's 
Bank of China. To account for potential industry effects, the sampled firms are further 
classified into six broadly defined industry categories in line with the CSMAR industry 
code A. 
Table 4.2 presents summary statistics, where panel A focuses on the full sample 
and panel B breaks down into two sub-groups, i.e., firms with and without U.S. listings. 
In order to address the impact of exchange choices, I further divide the sample of cross-
listed firms into exchange-based and non-exchange-based listings in panel C. The 
variables are defined as follows: SIZE is the size of the firm, calculated as the natural log 
of total assets; BM is the book-to-market ratio, measured as the difference between total 
assets and total liabilities, divided by the stock market capitalization of the firm; LEV is 
the leverage (debt-to-equity) ratio; ROA is the return on assets, computed as earnings 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (EBXI) divided by total assets; 
and RET is the monthly holding period return on a firm's common stock (using 
continuously compounded return leads to consistent results). 
***Insert Table 4.2 about here*** 
As panel B of Table 4.2 indicates, firms with U.S. listings have an average book-
to-market ratio that is much lower than that of comparable home country firms (1.58 
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relative to 15.62), suggesting that cross-listed firms tend to face better growth 
opportunities than their home market peers. This observation is highly consistent with 
the findings of Doidge et al. (2004), which indicate that firms with U.S. listings have an 
average Tobin's Q ratio that is 16.5% higher than that of similar home country firms. 
Additionally, Chinese firms without foreign listings appear to have an unusually high 
book-to-market ratio. One possible explanation for this is that Chinese firms are more 
reluctant to write down their assets. Moreover, cross-listed firms tend to be more 
profitable than their home country peers in terms of the ROA ratio (6.2% relative to 
3.2%), suggesting that cross-listing on a more regulated market serves as an effective 
device in cultivating corporate efficiency. In terms of the holding period return, I find 
that the average return is higher among cross-listed firms than among non-cross-listed 
firms (3.33% relative to 2.76%), implying that cross-listed firms may have a higher cost 
of capital compared to their purely domestic-listed peers. However, such a comparison 
must be viewed cautiously, since neither market-wide nor firm-specific characteristics 
have been taken into account. 
As panel C of Table 4.2 indicates, NYSE-listed firms are generally larger (with an 
average size of 24.72, as opposed to 21.60) and more efficiently operated (with a ROA 
ratio of 7.6%, as opposed to 5.6%) than firms that choose OTC listings and private 
placements. In addition, exchange-listed firms tend to rely more on debt financing than 
non-exchange-listed firms (with a leverage ratio of 2.52, as opposed to 1.06). This 
phenomenon can be well explained by the price correction hypothesis. If the cost of price 
correction associated with exchange listings is too high, then it is rational for NYSE-
listed firms to rely on debt financing due to the concern of stock undervaluation. 
4.3.2. Price Synchronicity 
In line with the literature (e.g., Chan and Hameed, 2006; Morck et al., 2000; Roll, 
1988), this study uses the R-squared value from the regression of the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) to measure the departure of firm-specific stock movements from the 
market. In the literature, many studies include industry returns in the regression (see, for 
example, Durnev et al., 2004; Gul et al., 2010; Roll, 1998). It is argued, however, that in 
studies that focus on emerging markets, the inclusion of industry returns as an additional 
independent variable might be problematic, because of the difficulties in disentangling 
the industry effect from the market and the fact that some industries are dominated by a 
few firms (e.g., Chan and Hameed, 2006). This study follows Chan and Hameed's 
approach.9 In particular, the following model is estimated: 
(Rlt-R1F) = cx + /3(R1M-R1F) + £u (1) 
where Rjt is the stock return for each individual firm at time t, R^ is the corresponding 
market return at time t, R' is the risk-free rate (China's monthly yield of the three-month 
household deposit interest rate) at time t; and /? is the covariance of the market return with 
the portfolio return divided by the variance of the market return. 
According to the Hausman specification test, the one-way random effects model 
is utilized. This means that, in general, the residual consists of two parts, that is, 
en = it, + v„. For a more precise estimation, the error components model and generalized 
least squares (GLS) estimation are also applied. The R-squared values from model (1) 
9 As a robustness check, additional models with industry returns are also investigated, where the results are 
statistically unaffected. 
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are then used to measure the departure of firm-specific movements from the market, 
specifically, 
In this study, I use alphas from model (1) as an indicator of abnormal returns. 
Since the omitted-variables problem is generally less of a serious concern for panel 
models than for cross-sectional models (because the past values of the variables in the 
panel will partly control for the effects of the missing variables), the Sharpe-Lintner-
Black model seems to be capable of detecting risk-adjusted abnormal returns. 
In terms of hypothesis testing, if U.S. listing indeed leads to more accurate stock 
valuation (as HI contends), then the alphas should be less significantly different from 
zero for cross-listed firms. If cross-listing plays an important role in inducing more 
informative stock prices (as H2 contends), then stock movements should be less 
synchronous among cross-listed firms than among non-cross-listed firms, that is, 
R2C < R2NC . Likewise, if stock prices are more informative among exchange listings (as 
H4 contends), then the R-squared value should be lower for NYSE-listed firms than for 
firms that choose OTC listings and private placements, that is R2E < R2NE. 
4.3.3. Price-Earnings Relationship 
Following the suggestions of Kothari and Zimmerman (1995), this study 
considers the price-earnings relationship based on both the price and return models to 
ensure that the empirical results are not sensitive to the way that the model is specified. 
In price models, stock prices are regressed on earnings per share figures, whereas in 
(2) 
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return models, stock returns are regressed on scaled earnings. In particular, the following 
models are estimated: 
P ^ a + f i X . + e , (3) 
PJPltA=a+pXuIPitA+sit (4) 
where Pu is the trading day closing price at time t, Xu is the earnings per share figure at 
time t, and Pi t_x is the trading day closing price at time t-1. Note that equation (4) is 
considered a return model because Pitl Piequals one plus the holding period return. 
In the literature, studies estimating the price-earnings relationship are interested 
in both the significance of the estimated slope coefficient, i.e., the earnings response 
coefficient (ERC), and the explanatory power of the model. In particular, if earnings are 
related to stock prices, the estimated ERC should be significantly different from zero and 
the model should explain a large portion of variation in stock prices (or returns). In the 
context of this study, H3 implies that firms with U.S. listings will have more significant 
ERCs and higher R-squared values as compared to their home country peers, that is, 
ERCR > ERCNC a n d R?: > R2NC. 
4.3.4. Robustness Checks 
As mentioned in Table 4.1, an interesting feature associated with the sample is 
that, in addition to U.S. listings, the firms tend to cross-list simultaneously on some other 
Asian markets, such as the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Chinese B-share market. 
With these additional listing choices, observing a positive relationship between U.S. 
listing and price informativeness does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that listing 
on the U.S. market mitigates firm-specific information asymmetry. The observed relation 
may be attributable to Hong Kong or B-share listings rather than U.S. listings. 
An effective way to address this issue is to compare the price synchronicity before 
and after a firm's U.S. listing, while keeping all the other listing choices constant. To 
construct a subsample of cross-listed firms for this purpose, I further require the sample 
firms to have at least three years of domestic A-share listings before their U.S. listings. 
Due to the short history of the Chinese stock market and the fact that a majority of 
Chinese firms engage in domestic and U.S. listings simultaneously, only 4 firms are 
qualified for this purpose. Given the extremely small sample size, I investigate the 4 
firms individually. In order to rule out short-run disturbance around U.S. listings, the 
pre- and post-cross-listing periods are constructed with a gap of six months before and a 
gap of six months after the listing events. The time frame of estimation is illustrated in 
Figure 4.1. The only exception is Tianjin Capital Environment Protection (TCEPY), for 
which I test an earlier pre-cross-listing period in order to avoid the firm-specific 
disturbance of corporate restructuring between late 1998 and late 2000. If U.S. listing 
indeed mitigates home country information asymmetry and stock misvaluation, then the 
firm should exhibit more informative and less overvalued stock prices after U.S. listing. 
***Insert Figure 4.1 about here*** 
4.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 4.3 reports the regression results regarding abnormal returns and stock price 
synchronicity. Following the literature, this study uses the R-squared value from the 
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regression of the CAPM to measure the departure of firm-specific stock movements from 
the market, and, hence, the capitalization of firm-specific information. 
***Insert Table 4.3 about here*** 
Based on columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.3, Chinese firms with U.S. listings generally 
realize insignificant risk-adjusted abnormal returns on their home market (t = 0.31), 
whereas their domestic peers enjoy positive and significant abnormal returns (t = 4.67). 
This finding indicates that U.S. listing plays an important role in mitigating the listing 
firm's home market stock misvaluation (HI is supported). In addition, the R-squared 
value is much lower for cross-listed firms than for non-cross-listed firms (25% relative to 
28%), suggesting that cross-listed firms are valued more on firm-specific information, 
whereas non-cross-listed firms are valued more on market-wide information, all else 
being equal (H2 is supported). 
In addition, a close comparison between columns 3 and 4 indicates that NYSE-
listed firms tend to have more informative (with the R-squared value of 18.7%, as 
opposed to 25.2%) and less overvalued stock prices (as reflected by lower risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns) relative to firms that choose OTC listings and private placements (H4 
is supported). These findings imply that higher listing standards tend to promote 
informed trading, facilitate the capitalization of firm-specific information, and result in 
more precisely valued stocks. 
Given the empirical difficulties in measuring the content of information, the 
association between price and earnings is further investigated as a cross check for the 
capitalization of firm-specific information. The empirical results are reported in Table 
4.4, where panel A focuses on the price model and panel B considers the return model. 
***Insert Table 4.4 about here*** 
Consistent with the empirical findings in Table 4.3, columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.4 
indicate that the price-earnings relationship is much stronger for cross-listed firms than 
for non-cross-listed firms. The estimated slope coefficient, or the ERC, is positive and 
significant for firms with U.S. listings (t = 5.50 in the price model and t = 2.00 in the 
return model), whereas it is insignificant for purely domestic-listed firms (t = 0.55 in the 
price model and t = 1.00 in the return model). In line with the findings on the ERC, the 
R-squared value is found to be much higher for cross-listed firms than for non-cross-
listed firms (4.15% relative to 0% in the price model, and 0.57% relative to 0% in the 
return model). As can be seen, the results in panels A and B are highly consistent, 
indicating that the empirical findings in Table 4.3 are not contingent upon model 
specifications. Overall, these findings indicate that U.S. listing plays an important role in 
promoting the capitalization of value-relevant, firm-specific information (H3 is 
supported). 
Moreover, as columns 3 and 4 indicate, the price-earnings relationship is much 
stronger among NYSE-listed firms than among firms that choose OTC listings and 
private placements, in terms of both the ERC (t = 6.31 relative to 4.58 in the price model, 
and t = 2.53 relative to 1.87 in the return model) and the R-squared value (16% relative to 
4% in the price model, and 8% relative to 0.7% in the return model). In sum, these 
results suggest that stock prices of exchange-listed firms contain more value-relevant 
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corporate information, and that listing standards play an important role in shaping the 
content of information in stock valuation (H4 is supported). 
As a robustness check, I further investigate the price synchronicity of listing firms 
before and after their U.S. listings. The empirical results are reported in Table 4.5. If 
listing in the U.S. indeed allows investors to rely more on firm-specific information, then 
one should observe less synchronous and more precisely valued stock prices upon U.S. 
listings. Consistent with the price correction hypothesis, all 4 firms experience dramatic 
declines in price synchronicity after their U.S. listings: the R-squared value decreases 
from 38.4% to 23.5% for Far East Pharmaceutical Technology (FEPTY), declines from 
53.1% to 37.4% for Angang Steel (ANGGY), falls from 75.1% to 31.3% for Shanghai 
Jinqiao Export Processing Zone Development (SJQIY), and drops from 40.0% to 24.5% 
for Tianjin Capital Environment Protection (TCEPY). 
The fitted values for these robustness tests are plotted in Figure 4.2. As the 
figures indicate, the model fits decrease dramatically in the post-cross-listing period for 
all 4 firms, implying that more firm-specific (less market-wide) information is 
incorporated into stock prices as a result of U.S. listing. 
***Insert Table 4.5 about here*** 
* * *Insert Figure 4.2 about here * * * 
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4.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This essay examines a panel sample of Chinese firms with and without U.S. 
listings to address the role of cross-listing in mitigating home country information 
asymmetry and stock misvaluation. In contrast with conventional theories that predict 
enormous cross-listing benefits, this study finds no significant cross-listing premiums. 
Further investigation indicates that the absence of cross-listing premiums for these 
Chinese firms is mainly a result of a downward price correction (toward the fundamental 
values of the stocks) once more firm-specific information is capitalized into stock prices. 
In particular, I find that firms with U.S. listings tend to exhibit more informative and less 
overvalued stock prices (as reflected by lower risk-adjusted abnormal returns) than 
comparable home country firms. Within the sample of cross-listed firms, I find that 
exchange-based U.S. listings result in more informative and less overvalued stock prices 
than OTC listings and private placements. The positive relationships among listing 
standards, stock price informativeness, and the magnitude of price correction provide 
strong empirical support to the price correction interpretation of the absence of cross-
listing premiums. 
While the present study extends and complements the current literature in many 
aspects, some caveats should be noted. First, the results of this study are inconsistent 
with conventional theories that predict enormous cross-listing benefits. Nevertheless, this 
apparent conflict can be reconciled easily in a contingency framework. The argument is 
that in an environment filled with severe information asymmetry and stock misvaluation, 
as found in China, the presence of cross-listing premiums depends on the relative power 
of two distinct effects, i.e., the cross-listing benefits and the downward price correction. 
No premiums will be documented if the downward price pressure is large enough to 
offset cross-listing benefits. This is the very case in China. A major challenge facing the 
price correction hypothesis, however, is the question why do these Chinese firms choose 
to cross-list in the U.S., given the absence of cross-listing premiums. This paradox merits 
further research. Second, the evidence of this study is based on a single-country analysis. 
It would be interesting to consider other weak institutional environments with similar 
firm-specific information asymmetry and stock misvaluation to determine the 
generalizability of the results. Third, while the empirical results of this study point to a 
possible explanation of the absence of cross-listing premiums in China, alternative 
explanations cannot be safely ruled out without additional investigation. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the present study offers a number of new 
insights into the literature. First, while the issue of international listings has been 
subjected to extensive research, little attention has been paid to exploring the role of 
cross-listing, taking into account the unique characteristics of a country. This study 
examines the role of cross-listing in an environment filled with severe firm-specific 
information asymmetry and stock misvaluation. By addressing cross-listing practices in a 
contingency framework (contingent on the unique environment of the listing firm's home 
market), this study extends our understanding of how unique environmental features can 
shape the effectiveness of a particular corporate strategy. 
Second, while the issue of stock misvaluation has been researched significantly in 
the field of investment, whether and to what extent the inherent misvaluation can be 
mitigated through a particular firm strategy and/or a major change in the information 
environment is still an empirical question. Using a panel sample of Chinese firms, this 
study indicates that cross-listing (and the resultant improvement in the information 
environment) is an effective device in deterring a listing firm's home country information 
asymmetry and stock misvaluation. 
Finally, despite the growing interest in understanding the Chinese capital market, 
empirical evidence to date has been rare and inconclusive in documenting the impact of 
cross-listing on Chinese firms. For example, Doidge et al. (2004) find that foreign 
companies with shares cross-listed in the United States are worth more than similar home 
country firms using data from 40 countries, and Doidge et al. (2009) find that firms' 
decisions to cross-list involve a trade-off between private control and bonding benefits 
using data from 31 countries. However, China is excluded from both studies. By testing 
the generalizability of existing theories to the Chinese stock market, this study offers an 




This dissertation examines the role of cross-listing in shaping corporate earnings 
quality, stock price informativeness, and firm valuation, as well as its impact on a listing 
firm's home country information asymmetry and stock misvaluation. 
The first essay addresses the information asymmetry between Chinese local A-
share and foreign B-share markets and its impact on the B-share discount puzzle, 
contingent upon the regulatory reforms of Chinese stock market liberalization in 2001 
and 2002. In contrast with the widespread belief that domestic investors are better 
informed than foreign investors, this study indicates that foreign investors actually 
possess more value-relevant, firm-specific information in an emerging environment such 
as China, where information transparency and investor protection are relatively weak. In 
particular, I find that under perfect market segmentation, information tends to flow from 
foreign to domestic investors and that B-share prices are generally more informative than 
their A-share counterparts. As such, the observed Chinese B-share discount is not 
compensation for the informational disadvantage of foreign investors but, rather, the 
result of a downward price correction (toward the fundamental values of the stocks) once 
more firm-specific information is capitalized by sophisticated foreign investors. Further 
investigation indicates a mitigated degree of information asymmetry and B-share 
discount after market liberalization. 
The second essay investigates the changing impact of cross-listing on corporate 
earnings management, stock price informativeness, and firm value, contingent upon 
increased market integration. In line with the bonding hypothesis, I find that Chinese 
firms with foreign listings manage their earnings less than comparable purely domestic-
listed firms, although the divergence in earnings quality has been less evident since the 
regulatory reforms of Chinese stock market liberalization. Consistent with the findings 
on earnings management, firms with foreign listings are found to have more informative 
stock pricing (as measured by price synchronicity) and higher valuation (as measured by 
Tobin's Q) than firms without foreign listings. Further investigation indicates a reduced 
level of divergence in both price informativeness and firm value upon market integration. 
Overall, the results suggest that cross-listing plays a significant but diminishing bonding 
role in an increasingly integrated world. The empirical findings of this essay also point to 
a possible explanation for the worldwide foreign delisting wave that has been plaguing 
major stock exchanges. 
The third essay examines a panel sample of Chinese firms with and without U.S. 
listings to address the role of cross-listing in mitigating a listing firm's home country 
information asymmetry and stock misvaluation. In contrast with conventional theories 
that predict enormous cross-listing benefits, this study finds no significant cross-listing 
premiums. Further investigation indicates that the absence of cross-listing premiums for 
these Chinese firms is mainly a result of a downward price correction (toward the 
fundamental values of the stocks) once U.S. listing allows for an enhanced capitalization 
of firm-specific information. In particular, I find that stock prices of firms with U.S. 
listings are more informative (as measured by less synchronous stock movements and 
stronger price-earnings relationships) and less overvalued (as reflected by lower risk-
adjusted abnormal returns) than comparable home country firms. Within the sample of 
cross-listed firms, I find that exchange-based U.S. listings result in more informative and 
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less overvalued stocks than OTC listings and private placements. The positive 
relationships among listing standards, stock price informativeness, and the magnitude of 
price correction provide strong empirical support to the price correction interpretation of 
the absence of cross-listing premiums. 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in multiple ways. First, it addresses 
various ongoing debates and current paradoxes, such as the information asymmetry 
between domestic and foreign investors in emerging markets, the absence of cross-listing 
premiums in some countries, and the dialogue between bonding and signaling effects. By 
analyzing the impact of cross-listing in a contingency framework (contingent on the 
unique features of a listing firm's home country), this study offers a possible 
reconciliation to the conflicting empirical findings that have been plaguing the literature. 
It also extends our understanding of how unique environmental features can shape the 
effectiveness of a particular corporate strategy. 
Second, while the issue of cross-listing has stimulated a considerable amount of 
quality research, a common limitation associated with these studies is that they tend to 
consider cross-listing impact in a static framework. The effect of increased market 
integration on the dynamics of cross-listing (and delisting) decisions is largely ignored. 
Drawing on the unique opportunity of Chinese stock market restructuring in 2001 and 
2002, this dissertation effectively addresses the changing role of cross-listing under 
increased market integration within a relatively short time frame, where structural 
stationarity and omitted-variables problems are of less serious modeling concern. 
Finally, despite the growing interest in understanding the Chinese capital market, 
empirical evidence to date has been rare and inconclusive in documenting the impact of 
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cross-listing on Chinese firms, and China has been excluded from many influential 
studies. This study adds to the literature by examining the impact of cross-listing on 
Chinese firms in the context of earnings management, stock price informativeness, and 
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Table 2.1. Price differential between the twin-share portfolios. 
This table reports the price differential between the local A and foreign B shares issued by the 
same companies. To facilitate a meaningful comparison, the analysis is made contingent upon 
different sample periods (i.e., the pre-market-integration period, from October 1, 1997 to 
February 19, 2001, the post-market-integration period, from November 5, 2002 to September 30, 
2007, and the restructuring period, from February 19, 2001 to November 5, 2002) and the choice 
of exchange listings (SSE or SZSE). The final sample consists of 53 firms (26 SSE-listed and 
27 SZSE-listed), each with a continuous dual-listing history over the entire sample period. 
A-Share B-Share Price 
Portfolio Portfolio Differential 
Panel A. SSE-Listed Firms (26 Firms) 
The Pre-Market-Liberalization Period 11.988 2.133 9.855 
(2.06) (0.78) 
The Period of Market Restructuring 14.119 7.086 7.033 
(1.99) (1.32) 
The Post-Market-Liberalization Period 7.449 3.650 3.799 
(2.19) (0.99) 
Panel B. SZSE-Listed Firms (27 Firms) 
The Pre-Market-Liberalization Period 11.649 2.711 8.938 
(1.98) (0.64) 
The Period of Market Restructuring 12.228 6.409 5.819 
(1.65) (1.52) 
The Post-Market-Liberalization Period 7.317 4.392 2.925 
(1.81) (0.84) 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 2.2. Correlation matrix. 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients of the A and B twin-share portfolios with 
each other and with the four market indices (i.e., the Shanghai A-, Shanghai B-, Shenzhen A-, 
and Shenzhen B-share markets), where the null hypothesis is of no correlation. 
Panel A. SSE-Listed Firms 






















Panel B. SZSE-Listed Firms 























Table 2.3. Information criteria for different model specifications. 
This table reports the information criteria statistics for different model specifications with lag 
lengths ranging from 1 to 20 (i.e., from one day to one month). To obtain a more precise 
specification, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC) are 
considered jointly in identifying the order of the VAR. 
Order 1 Order 2 Order 3 Order 4 Order 5 Order 10 Order 20 
Panel A. Model Specification 1 
AIC -3.4465 -3.4325 











Panel B. Model Specification 2 
AIC 0.1827 0.1834 











Panel C. Model Specification 3 
AIC -0.2549 -0.2540 












Table 2.4. Lead-lag relation during the pre-market-integration period. 
This table reports the VAR estimates during the pre-market-integration period, from October 1, 1997 to 
February 19, 2001, based on the following different model specifications: 
'SHA,' 'SHA, -k ' SHA I,_,' SSHA,t 
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Model 3 'SZA,' 
SZB, = A 
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where SHA, and SHBt are the SSE-listed twin-share portfolio returns at time t, and SZA, and SZB' are the 
SZSE-listed twin-share portfolio returns at time t. Note that the SSE-listed twin-share portfolios include 26 
A- and B-share dual-listed firms, and the SZSE-listed twin-share portfolios include 27 A- and B-share dual-
listed firms. The variables SHAI,, SHBIt, SZAI,, and SZBI, are the corresponding market returns at time t. 
Here, A0 is a 4 X 1 column vector in Model 1 and a 2 X 1 column vector in Models 2 and 3, AK and Bl are 
4 x 4 matrices of coefficients in Model 1 and 2 x 2 matrices of coefficients in Models 2 and 3. The 
parameter k is the number of lagged endogenous variables and / is the number of lagged exogenous 
variables. According to AIC and SBC criteria, a lag length of 1 is chosen for all three model specifications. 
SHA(t-i) SHB (t- i) SZA (t -1) SZB (t -1) SHAI (t -1) SHBI (t -1) SZAI (t -1) SZBI (t -1) 



















































































The ^-values are in parentheses. Here, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 2.5. Lead-lag relation during the post-market-integration period. 
This table reports the VAR estimates during the post-market-integration period, from November 5, 2002 to 
September 30, 2007, based on the following different model specifications: 
'SHA,' 'SHA, -k SHAI,_, SSHA,1 










• k . 








S SZB,.1 _ 
Model 2: 'SHA,' 
SHB, =
 Ao 










Model 3: 'SZA,' 
SZB, =
 Ao 




-k _ 1=1 




_£ SZB,1 _ 
where SHA, and SHB, are the SSE-listed twin-share portfolio returns at time t, and SZA, and SZB, are the 
SZSE-listed twin-share portfolio returns at time t. Note that the SSE-listed twin-share portfolios include 26 
A- and B-share dual-listed firms, and the SZSE-listed twin-share portfolios include 27 A- and B-share dual-
listed firms. The variables SHAI,, SHBI,, SZAI,, and S7Rf are the corresponding market returns at time t. 
Here, 4 is a 4 X 1 column vector in Model 1 and a 2 X 1 column vector in Models 2 and 3, AK and Bt are 
4 x 4 matrices of coefficients in Model 1 and 2 x 2 matrices of coefficients in Models 2 and 3. The 
parameter k is the number of lagged endogenous variables and I is the number of lagged exogenous 
variables. According to AIC and SBC criteria, a lag length of 1 is chosen for all three model specifications. 
SHA (t-1) SHB (t -1) SZA(t- i) SZB (t -1) SHAI (t-l) SHBI (t- l) SZAI (t -1) SZBI (t -1) 



















































































The ^-values are in parentheses. Here, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 2.6. Price informativeness of the twin-share portfolios. 
This table reports the stock price synchronicity of the twin-share portfolios over the sample period from 
October 1997 to September 2007. For a more rigorous analysis, the regression is conducted contingent 
upon the choice of exchange listings (SSE or SZSE) and the two regulatory reforms (i.e., the opening of the 
foreign B-share market to Chinese domestic investors in 2001 and the opening of the local A-share market 
to QFII in 2002). The risk-adjusted abnormal return is estimated using the market model, 
( R , , , where Rii is the individual stock return at time t, R^ is the corresponding market 
return at time t, and R^ is the risk-free rate at time t. Following the literature, the price synchronicity is 
matured by the R-squared value from the capital asset pricing model. According to the Hausman 
specification test, the one-way random effects model is utilized. In order to get a more precise estimation, 
the error components model and GLS estimation are applied. 
Panel A. SSE-Listed Firms (26 Firms) 
Pre-Market- Period of Market Post-Market-













a Estimate 0.046 -0.129* 0.294* 0.401* -0.107* -0.101* 
(1.50) (-2.76) (10.41) (10.43) (-4.38) (-4.88) 
P Estimate 1.021* 0.932* 1.151* 1.127* 1.008* 0.994* 
(92.1) (55.7) (99.7) (71.6) (87.3) (101.2) 
R Squared 0.304 0.137 0.482 0.324 0.225 0.281 
Panel B. SZSE-Listed Firms (27 Firms) 
Pre-Market- Period of Market Post-Market-





































R Squared 0.335 0.121 0.486 0.335 0.273 0.274 
The ^-values are in parentheses. Here, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
Table 3.1. Summary statistics. 
This table reports the summary statistics of the sample, sorted by exchange listing (columns 2 and 3), the 
choice of B-share listings (columns 4 and 5), and the time period of estimation (columns 6 and 7). The 
variables in the table are defined as follows: SIZE is the size of the firm, calculated as the natural log of 
total assets; BM is the book-to-market ratio, measured as the difference between total assets and total 
liabilities, divided by the stock market capitalization of the firm; LEV is the leverage (debt-to-equity) ratio; 
SO is state ownership, measured as the percentage of common shares owned by the state; ROA is the ROA 
ratio, computed as EBXI divided by total assets; and Q is the Tobin's Q ratio, calculated as the book value 
of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity, divided by the book value of 
total assets. The final sample consists of 701 firms (67 A- and B-share dual-listed firms and 634 
comparable purely domestic-listed firms), each with a continuous listing history over the entire sample 
period from 1998 to 2006. 

















































































































Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.2. Correlation matrix. 
This table reports the correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables. The variables in the table are 
defined as follows: DCROSS is the cross-listing dummy, which takes the value of 1 for firms with both A-
and B-share listings and 0 for firms with only domestic A-share listings; DEXCH is the exchange dummy, 
where 1 stands for SSE-listed firms and 0 stands for SZSE-listed firms; SIZE is the size of the firm, 
calculated as the natural log of total assets; BM is the book-to-market ratio, measured as the difference 
between total assets and total liabilities, divided by the stock market capitalization of the firm; ROA is the 
ROA ratio, computed as EBXI divided by total assets; LEV is the leverage (debt-to-equity) ratio; and SO is 
state ownership, measured as the percentage of common shares owned by the state. The final sample 
consists of 701 firms (67 A- and B-share dual-listed firms and 634 comparable purely domestic-listed 
firms), each with a continuous listing history over the entire sample period from 1998 to 2006. 
DCROSS DEXCH SIZE BM ROA LEV SO 
DCROSS 1.0000 
DEXCH 0.0248* 1.0000 
SIZE 0.1412*** -0.0674*** 1.0000 
BM 0.0197 -0.0255* 0.5488*** 1.0000 
ROA 0.0094 -0.0177 0.1339*** 0.0603*** 1.0000 
LEV -0.0099 0.0135 -0.0188 -0.0306** -0.0008 1.0000 
SO -0.0186 -0.0210 0.1191*** 0.1032*** 0.0165 -0.0262* 1.0000 
Thep-values are in parentheses. Here *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 3.3. Earnings management. 
This table compares the magnitude of earnings management between cross-listed and non-cross-listed 
firms. Panel A is for the entire sample period and panel B breaks down into pre- and post-market-
integration periods. For a more rigorous analysis, earnings quality is measured using two alternative 
approaches: the absolute value of discretionary accruals, \DA\, and accruals quality, AQ. Here, \DA\ is 
calculated using the modified Jones (1991) model and AQ is measured as the standard deviation of 
residuals from the model that regresses current accruals on the lagged, current, and future values of CFO, 
change in sales revenues, and gross PPE. The final sample consists of 701 firms (67 A- and B-share dual-
listed firms and 634 comparable purely domestic-listed firms), each with a continuous listing history over 
the entire sample period from 1998 to 2006. 
Panel A: Earnings Management During the Full Sample Period 


















0.1026 0.1031 0.1020 0.0011 0.0965 0.1032 0.0067* 
(0.099) (0.102) (0.095) (0.082) (0.101) 
0.0769 0.0767 0.0739 0.0028*** 0.0673 0.0770 0.0097*** 
AQ (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) 
Panel B: Earnings Management Before and After Market Integration 





















0.1017 0.0795 0.1040 0.025*** 0.1070 0.1089 0.1068 -0.002 
(0.102) (0.068) (0.104) (0.100) (0.084) (0.100) 
0.0750 0.0580 0.0759 0.018*** 0.0790 0.0761 0.0783 0.002** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Here, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 3.4. Earnings management, year by year. 
This table compares the magnitude of earnings management between cross-listed and non-cross-listed 
firms, year by year. Consistent with Table 3.3, earnings quality is measured using two alternative 
approaches: the absolute value of discretionary accruals, \DA\, and accruals quality, AQ. Here, \DA\ is 
calculated using the modified Jones (1991) model and AQ is measured as the standard deviation of 
residuals from the model that regresses current accruals on the lagged, current, and future values of CFO, 
change in sales revenues, and gross PPE. The final sample consists of 701 firms (67 A- and B-share dual-
listed firms and 634 comparable purely domestic-listed firms), each with a continuous listing history over 
the entire sample period from 1998 to 2006. Note that there are no AQ values in 2006 because the 
observations of year 2006 are lost when calculating forward CFO. 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Panel A: Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals 
Cross-Listed 0.0815 0.0888 0.0681 0.0979 0.1068 0.1149 0.1038 0.1104 
Firms (0.062) (0.068) (0.073) (0.102) (0.076) (0.083) (0.084) (0.093) 
Non-Cross- 0.1077 0.1098 0.0946 0.0865 0.1186 0.1102 0.0971 0.1011 
listed Firms (0.100) (0.115) (0.097) (0.089) (0.121) (0.098) (0.083) (0.095) 
Mean Diff. 
(NC-CL) 0.026*** 0.021** 0.027*** -0.011 0.012 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 
Panel B: Accruals Quality 
Cross-Listed 0.0584 0.0553 0.0602 0.0691 0.0724 0.0749 0.0811 
Firms (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Non-Cross- 0.0743 0.0803 0.0730 0.0767 0.0780 0.0791 0.0779 
listed Firms (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mean Diff. 
(NC-CL) 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.004** -0.003** 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Here, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 3.5. Impact of cross-listing on earnings management. 
This table reports the regression results regarding the impact of cross-listing on earnings management. The 
dependent variable in the models is either the absolute value of discretionary accruals, \DA\ (columns 1-3), 
or accruals quality, AQ (columns 4-6). In particular, the following models are estimated: 
\DAi\ = ^+\DCROSSi, +l1DEXCHu +XiSIZEu +\BM„ +A,ROA„ +\LEVU +Z,SO„ +su (4) 
AQ, = +\DCROSSk +X1DEXCHU + ASSIZE,, +\BMU +AiROAt, +\LEV, +l,SOu +£„ (5) 
The independent variables are defined as follows: DCROSS is the cross-listing dummy, which takes the 
value of 1 for firms with both A- and B-share listings and 0 for firms with only domestic A-share listings; 
DEXCH is the exchange dummy, where 1 stands for SSE-listed firms and 0 stands for SZSE-listed firms; 
SIZE is the size of the firm, calculated as the natural log of total assets; BM is the book-to-market ratio, 
measured as the difference between total assets and total liabilities, divided by the stock market 
capitalization of the firm; ROA is the ROA ratio, computed as EBXI divided by total assets; LEV is the 
leverage (debt-to-equity) ratio; and SO is state ownership, measured as the percentage of common shares 
owned by the state. The final sample consists of 701 firms (67 A- and B-share dual-listed firms and 634 
comparable purely domestic-listed firms), each with a continuous listing history over the entire sample 
period from 1998 to 2006. 













Intercept 0.1592*** 0.1553*** 0.1440*** 0.0783*** 0.0760*** 0.0809*** 
(7.44) (2.95) (9.35) (67.76) (50.87) (81.72) 
DCROSS -0.0101* -0.0218*** -0.0062 -0.0096*** -0.0179*** -0.0021 
(-1.92) (-3.59) (-0.95) (-2.78) (-4.84) (-0.78) 
DEXCH -0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0002 0.00001 -0.00004 0.00007*** 
(-0.26) (-0.54) (-0.04) (0.19) (-0-51) (13.41) 
SIZE -0.0048*** -0.0048* -0.0037*** -0.0001 0.00001 -0.0001*** 
(-3.88) (-1.66) (-3.66) (-1.56) (0.23) (-3.78) 
BM 0.0023 0.0056 -0.0007 -0.00003 -0.00007 0.00002 
(0.93) (1.36) (-0.19) (-0.39) (-0.46) (1.18) 
ROA 0.4017*** 0.4109*** 0.4107*** -0.0014* -0.0019 -0.0009*** 
(6.18) (39.45) (2.96) (-1.93) (-1.02) (-3.16) 
LEV 0.0005** 0.0006 0.0003* -0.000004*** -0.000003 -0.000004** 
(2.34) (1.23) (1.82) (-2.87) (-0.97) (-2.56) 
SO -0.0128** -0.0239* -0.0035 0.0003*** 0.00004 0.0005*** 
(-2.13) (-1.85) (-0.73) (2.90) (0.43) (7.93) 
R2 0.1348 0.1019 0.1687 0.6998 0.9151 0.4581 
The /-values are in parentheses. Here, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 3.6. Price informativeness. 
This table reports the regression results regarding the impact of cross-listing on price informativeness. 
Following the literature, this study uses the R-squared value from the regression of the capital asset pricing 
model to measure the departure of firm-specific stock movements from the market, that is, 
(R.i-]f) = cc+fi(Rf £„• Here, Ru is the stock return for each individual firm at time t; Rf is the 
market return at time t\ and Rf is the risk-free rate at time t. According to the Hausman specification test, 
the one-way random effect model is utilized. For a more precise estimation, the error components model 
and GLS estimation are applied. The final sample consists of 701 firms (67 A- and B-share dual-listed 
firms and 634 comparable purely domestic-listed firms), each with a continuous listing history over the 
entire sample period from 1998 to 2006. 
Full Sample Pre-Market Integration Post—Market Integration 
Cross- Non-Cross- Cross- Non-Cross- Cross- Non-Cross-
Listed Listed Listed Listed Listed Listed 
a -0.1023*** -0.1445*** -0.1157** -0.0861*** -0.1640*** -0.1867*** 
(-7.77) (-32.76) (-2.24) (-12.66) (-10.3) (-34.06) 
P 0.6849*** 0.7852*** 1.3493*** 1.024*** 0.5193*** 0.6750*** 
(17.78) (61.02) (8.12) (46.19) (11.75) (44.66) 
R2 0.3720 0.4235 0.3332 0.5289 0.2929 0.3864 
The /-values are in parentheses. Here, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
110 
Table 3.7. Impact of cross-listing on price informativeness. 
This table reports the regression results regarding the impact of cross-listing on price informativeness. The 
dependent variable in the regression is price synchronicity, measured as SYNCH=Loz(-^—) > the 
^ 1-F? 
independent variables include a cross-listing dummy, an exchange dummy, firm size, the book-to-market 
ratio, ROA, leverage, state ownership, and trading volume. Specifically, the following model is estimated: 
SYNCH= ̂  +^DCROSSu +A1DEXCHU +A.SIZE,, +\BMit +A.ROA,, +\LEVU +A.SQ, +\VOL,, +eu (8) 
The independent variables are defined as follows: DCROSS is the cross-listing dummy, which takes the 
value of 1 for firms with both A- and B-share listings and 0 for firms with only domestic A-share listings; 
DEXCH is an exchange dummy, where 1 stands for SSE-listed firms and 0 stands for SZSE-listed firms; 
SIZE is the size of the firm, calculated as the natural log of total assets; BM is the book-to-market ratio, 
measured as the difference between total assets and total liabilities, divided by the stock market 
capitalization of the firm; ROA is the ROA ratio, computed as EBXI divided by total assets; LEV is the 
leverage (debt-to-equity) ratio; SO is state ownership, measured as the percentage of common shares owned 
by the state; and VOL is trading volume (in millions of shares). The final sample consists of 701 firms (67 
A- and B-share dual-listed firms and 634 comparable purely domestic-listed firms), each with a continuous 
listing history over the entire sample period from 1998 to 2006. 
Full Sample Period Pre-Market Integration Post-Market Integration 







































































































R2 0.0242 0.0242 0.0349 0.0365 0.0220 0.0220 
The ^-values are in parentheses. Here, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 3.8. Impact of cross-listing on firm value. 
This table reports the regression results regarding the impact of cross-listing on firm value. The dependent 
variable in the model is Tobin's Q, and the independent variables include a cross-listing dummy, an 
exchange dummy, firm size, the price-to-earnings ratio, leverage, and state ownership. Given the special 
relationship between Tobin's Q and the book-to-market ratio, the price-to-earnings ratio is utilized in this 
regression to control for growth opportunity. Specifically, the following model is estimated: 
Q„=a + pfiCROSS,, + P2DEXCHu + frSIZE,, + J34PE„ + frLEVfl + fi6SO„ + e„ (9) 
where Q is Tobin's Q ratio, computed as the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity, divided by the book value of total assets; DCROSS is the cross-listing dummy, 
which takes the value of 1 for firms with both A- and B-share listings and 0 for firms with only domestic 
A-share listings; DEXCH is an exchange dummy, where 1 stands for SSE-listed firms and 0 stands for 
SZSE-listed firms; SIZE is the size of the firm, calculated as the natural log of total assets; PE is the price-
to-earnings ratio, measured as current stock price divided by the earnings per share figure; LEV is the 
leverage (debt-to-equity) ratio; and SO is state ownership, measured as the percentage of common shares 
owned by the state. The final sample consists of 701 firms (67 A- and B-share dual-listed firms and 634 
comparable purely domestic-listed firms), each with a continuous listing history over the entire sample 
period from 1998 to 2006. 
Full Sample Period Pre-Market Integration Post-Market Integration 















































































R2 0.3341 0.3507 0.3400 0.3625 0.3177 0.3263 
The /-values are in parentheses. Here, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 3.9. Impact of cross-listing on earnings management (robustness check). 
This table reports the regression results regarding the impact of cross-listing on earnings management with 
lagged dependent variables. The dependent variable in the models is either the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, \DA\ (columns 1-3), or accruals quality, AQ (columns 4-6) . Specifically, the 
following models are estimated: 
\DAi\ = A0+\DCROSSi, +A1DEXCH„ +A,SIZEU +\BMU +\ROA1, +\LEV„ +A,SO„ +\DAll_] +£„ (10) 
AQ, = \+CROSS,, + \DFXCH„ + ̂ SIZE,, + \BM„ + \ROAll + \LEV„ + X,SO,, + +s„ (11) 
where DCROSS is the cross-listing dummy, where 1 stands for firms with both A- and B-share listings and 
0 stands for firms with only domestic A-share listings; DEXCH is the exchange dummy, where 1 stands for 
SSE-listed firms and 0 stands for SZSE-listed firms; SIZE is the size of the firm, calculated as the natural 
log of total assets; BM is the book-to-market ratio, measured as the difference between total assets and total 
liabilities, divided by the stock market capitalization of the firm; ROA is the ROA ratio, computed as EBXI 
divided by total assets; LEV is the leverage (debt-to-equity) ratio; and SO is state ownership, measured as 
the percentage of common shares owned by the state. The final sample consists of 701 firms (67 A- and B-
share dual-listed firms and 634 comparable purely domestic-listed firms), each with a continuous listing 
history over the entire sample period from 1998 to 2006. 
D V: Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals DV: Accruals Quality 
Full Sample Pre-Market Post-Market Full Sample Pre-Market Post-Market 
Period Integration Integration Period Integration Integration 
Intercept 0.1553*** 0.1574*** 0.1353*** 0.0481*** 0.0475** 0.0435*** 
(7.12) (3.11) (7.21) (5.05) (2.08) (5.48) 
DCROSS -0.0102* -0.0219*** -0.0061 -0.0054** -0.0116*** 0.0007 
(-1.93) (-3.62) (-0.95) (-2.08) (-5.31) (0.31) 
DEXCH -0.0007 -0.0024 -0.0002 0.00002 0.00001 0.00006*** 
(-0.30) (-0.59) (-0.04) (0.64) (0.14) (3.04) 
SIZE -0.0047*** -0.0049* -0.0035*** -0.00002 0.00002 -0.00006 
(-3.71) (-1.68) (-3.18) (-0.57) (0.41) (-1.54) 
BM 0.0024 0.0058 -0.0008 -0.00002 -0.00004 0.000001 
(0.94) (1.38) (-0.20) (-0.36) (-0.30) (0.07) 
ROA 0.4013*** 0.4107*** 0.4101*** -0.0009 -0.0018 -0.0001 
(6.18) (39.11) (2.96) (-1.19) (-0.97) (-0.20) 
LEV 0.0005** 0.0006 0.0004* -0.000003** -0.000003 -0.000003 
(2.38) (1.23) (1.88) (-2.05) (-0.84) (-1.34) 
SO -0.0130** -0.024* -0.0038 0.0002* -0.00001 0.0003*** 
(-2.15) (-1.81) (-0.81) (1.86) ( -o . i l ) (2.72) 
DA ( t_„ 0.0178 -0.0042 0.0352** 
(1.27) (-0-15) (2.11) 
AQ „_„ 0.3861*** 0.3756 0.4624*** 
(2.88) (1.16) (4.42) 
R2 0.1365 0.1036 0.1707 0.7487 0.9213 0.5612 
The ^-values are in parentheses. Here, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 4.1. Sample description. 
This table provides a brief description of the sample. The final sample consists of 27 U.S. listed Chinese 
firms (8 NYSE-listed firms and 19 OTC listings and private placements), each with a continuous cross-
listing history over the entire sample period from October 2004 to September 2007. 
Firm 
Domestic 







Panel A. NYSE Listed Firms 
SHI* 11/8/1993 7/23/1993 NYSE Chemicals BNY SSE 
CEA* 11/5/1997 1/30/1997 NYSE Travel & Leisure BNY SSE 
ZNH* 7/25/2003 7/24/1997 NYSE Travel & Leisure BNY SSE 
YZC* 7/1/1998 3/27/1998 NYSE Mining BNY SSE 
CHU* 10/9/2002 6/16/2000 NYSE Mobile Telecom. BNY SSE 
SNP* 8/8/2001 10/18/2000 NYSE Oil & Gas Producers CIT SSE 
CEO* 2/5/2002 2/20/2001 NYSE Oil & Gas Producers MGT SSE 
HNP* 12/6/2001 8/19/2003 NYSE Electricity BNY SSE 
Panel B. OTC & Private Placements 
MAAPP* 1/6/1994 11/1/1993 PORTAL Industrial Metals CIT SSE 
SHFGY** 3/27/1992 12/1/1993 OTC Industrial Engineer BNY SSE 
SLLBY** 11/13/1992 3/1/1994 OTC Chemicals BNY SSE 
YIRPP* 4/11/1995 3/25/1994 PORTAL Chemicals CIT SSE 
SGOTY** 5/4/1993 5/1/1995 OTC Real Estate BNY SSE 
GSHIY* 10/28/1993 7/13/1995 OTC Industrial Engineer BNY SSE 
DCHLY** 12/4/1992 10/1/1995 OTC Auto & Parts BNY SSE 
TSGTY* 8/27/1993 2/1/1996 OTC Beverages BNY SSE 
CSDXY* 5/23/2002 3/1/1996 OTC & PORTAL Industrial Transport. BNY SSE 
SJQIY** 3/26/1993 7/1/1996 OTC Real Estate BNY SSE 
SLUJY** 6/28/1993 7/1/1996 OTC Real Estate BNY SSE 
GZPHY* 2/6/2001 6/21/2002 OTC Pharmacy & Biotech BNY SSE 
JEXYY* 1/16/2001 12/23/2002 OTC Industrial Transport BNY SSE 
JIXAY* 1/11/2002 10/7/2003 OTC Mining BNY SSE 
TCEPY* 6/30/1995 12/23/2003 OTC Gas & Utilities BNY SSE 
SZPRY* * 9/15/1993 8/1/1994 OTC Real Estate BNY SZSE 
JLMT** 12/1/1993 9/29/1995 Reg. S Industrial Engineer CIT SZSE 
ANGGY* 12/25/1997 12/6/2002 OTC Industrial Metals BNY SZSE 
FEPTY* 1/21/1997 3/2/2004 OTC Pharmacy & Biotech DB SZSE 
* Firms cross-listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. ** Firms cross-listed on the B-share market. 
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Table 4.2. Summary statistics. 
This table reports the summary statistics of the sample, where panel A focuses on the full sample and panel 
B breaks down into two sub-groups, i.e., firms with and without U.S. listings. To address the impact of U.S. 
listing choices, the sample of cross-listed firms is further divided into exchange-based and non-exchange-
based listings in panel C. The variables are defined as follows: SIZE is the size of the firm, calculated as 
the natural log of total assets; BM is the book-to-market ratio, measured as the difference between total 
assets and total liabilities, divided by the stock market capitalization of the firm; LEV is the leverage (debt-
to-equity) ratio; ROA is the return on assets, computed as EBXI divided by total assets; and RET is the 
monthly holding period return on a firm's common stock. The final sample consists of 843 firms (27 cross-
listed firms and 816 comparable purely domestic-listed firms), each with a continuous listing history over 
the entire sample period from October 2004 to September 2007. 
Panel B. Cross-Listed vs. Non- Panel C. Exchange vs. Non-
















21.425 21.727 21.366 24.720 21.598 
(0.95) (1.54) (0.87) (1.37) (1.12) 
BM 
15.121 1.577 15.616 0.835 1.889 
(29.63) (2.32) (30.11) (0.40) (2.69) 
LEV 
1.440 1.493 1.438 2.520 1.061 
(5.21) (2.28) (5.28) (3.72) (0.98) 
0.033 0.062 0.0320 0.076 0.056 
ROA (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) 
2.774 3.333 2.756 3.364 3.321 
RET (16.20) (13.82) (16.27) (13.21) (14.08) 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.3. Abnormal returns and stock price synchronicity. 
This table reports the regression results regarding abnormal returns and stock price synchronicity. 
Following the literature, this study uses the R-squared value from the regression of the capital asset pricing 
model to measure the departure of firm-specific stock movements from the market, that is, 
(Ril-Rf)=a+/}(Fy-Rf)+£jl • Here, R.t is the stock return for each individual firm at time t, R^ is the 
corresponding market return at time t, and Rf is the risk-free rate at time t. According to the Hausman 
specification test, the one-way random effect model is utilized. For a more precise estimation, the error 
components model and GLS estimation are applied. The final sample consists of 27 cross-listed firms and 
816 comparable purely domestic-listed firms, each with a continuous listing history over the entire sample 
period from October 2004 to September 2007. 
Cross-Listed vs. Non-Cross-Listed Firms Exchange vs. Non—Exchange Listings 
Firms with U.S. Firms without U.S. OTC& Private 
listings listings NYSE Placements 
(27 Firms) (816 Firms) (8Firms) (19 Firms) 
a Estimate 0.0014 0.0137*** 0.0007 0.0322** 
(0.31) (4.67) (0.07) (2.06) 
P Estimate 0.8869*** 1.3017*** 0.9009*** 1.0007*** 
(17.86) (53.08) (8.00) (7.55) 
R Squared 0.2520 0.2773 0.1871 0.2521 
The /-values are in parentheses. Here, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 4.4. Price-earnings relation. 
This table reports the regression results regarding the price-earnings relation, where panel A focuses on the 
price model, /> =a+pxu +su, and panel B considers the return model, pu =a+pxj+s„ • Here, Pjt is 
the trading day closing price at time t, Xu is the earnings per share figure at time t, and p. { [ is the trading 
day closing price at time t - l . According to the Hausman specification test, the one-way random effect 
model is utilized. For a more precise estimation, the error components model and GLS estimation are 
applied. The final sample consists of 27 cross-listed firms and 816 comparable home country firms, each 
with a continuous listing history over the entire sample period from October 2004 to September 2007. 
Panel A. Price Model Pu =a+PXU +£„ 
Cross-Listed vs. Non-Cross-Listed Firms Exchange vs. Non-Exchange Listings 
Firms with U.S. Firms without U.S. OTC& Private 
listings listings NYSE Placements 
(27 Firms) (816 Firms) (8Firms) (19 Firms) 
a Estimate 5.8832*** 5.9034*** 5.1501*** 5.5348*** 
(5.27) (24.57) (4.10) (4.48) 
P Estimate 0.6611*** 0.00001 3.4764*** 0.5327*** 
(5.50) (0.56) (6.31) (4.58) 
R Squared 0.0415 0.0000 0.1621 0.0409 
Panel B. Return Model PJPijA =cc+pxu IPifA +s„ 
Cross-Listed vs. Non-Cross-Listed Firms 
a Estimate 


































The /-values are in parentheses. Here, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 4.5. Price synchronicity before and after U.S. listing. 
This table reports the price synchronicity before and after U.S. listings for the 4 firms that have sufficient 
pre-cross-listing histories. Following the literature, this study uses the R-squared value from the regression 
of the capital asset pricing model to measure the departure of firm-specific stock movements from the 
market, that is, (Rll-Rf) = a+f}(Rf -Rf)+sir Here, Rjt is the stock return for each individual firm at time t, 
R^1 is the corresponding market return at time t, and R^ is the risk-free rate at time t. According to the 
Hausman specification test, the one-way random effect model is utilized. For a more precise estimation, 
the error components model and GLS estimation are applied. 
FEPTY 
U.S. Listing Date: 
March 2, 2004 
ANGGY 
U.S. Listing Date: 
December 6, 2002 
SJQIY 
U.S. Listing Date: 
July 1, 1996 
TCEPY 
U.S. Listing Date: 
December 23, 2003 





3.632 -2.487 -1.815 -2.001 
(-1.25) (-1.36) (-1.20) (-0.96) 
P 1.117*** 0.824*** 0.879*** 1.072*** 1.257*** 0.838*** 0.823*** 0.897*** 
(4.53) (3.18) (6.12) (4.44) (9.98) (3.88) (4.69) (3.27) 
R2 0.384 0.235 0.531 0.374 0.751 0.313 0.400 0.245 
The /-values are in parentheses. Here, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Figure 2.1. Estimation time frame. 
This figure illustrates the time frame of estimation. As indicated, the two regulatory reforms (i.e., 
the opening of the foreign B-share market to Chinese domestic investors on February 19, 2001 and 
the opening of the local A-share market to QFII on November 5, 2002) have divided the sample into 
three subperiods: the pre-market-liberalization period, the post-market-liberalization period, and the 
period of market restructuring. 
Oct. 1997 Feb. 19,2001 Nov. 5 ,2002 Sept. 2007 
Market Restructuring 
Pre-Market-Liberalization Period Post—Market-Liberalization Period 
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Figure 2.2. Plotting the price divergence between the twin-share portfolios. 
These figures plot the dynamic pattern of the price differential between the local A and foreign B 
shares that are issued by the same companies. The estimation period spans the two regulatory 
reforms (i.e., the opening of the foreign B-share market to Chinese domestic investors in 2001 
and the opening of the local A-share market to QFII in 2002). 
Price Divergence between the Twin—Share Portfolios (SSE) 
D a t e 
P L O T S H A S H B A 
Price Divergence between the Twin—Share Portfolios (SZSE) 
D o t e 
P L O T S Z A S Z B A 
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Figure 2.3. Plotting the B-share discount. 
These figures plot the B-share discount over the sample period from October 1997 to 
September 2007. The estimation period spans the two regulatory reforms (i.e., the 
opening of the foreign B-share market to Chinese domestic investors in 2001 and the 
opening of the local A-share market to QFII in 2002). 
The B-Share Discount (SSE) 
D o t e 
The B-Share Discount (SZSE) 
D o t e 
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Figure 2.4. Plotting the twin-share portfolio returns. 
These figures plot the stock returns of the twin-share portfolios over the sample period 
from October 1997 to September 2007. The estimation period spans the two regulatory 
reforms (i.e., the opening of the foreign B-share market to Chinese domestic investors in 
2001 and the opening of the local A-share market to QFII in 2002). 
Plotting the Twin Share Portfolio Returns on SSE 
D o t e 
P L O T S H A R S H B R 
Plotting the Twin Share Portfolio Returns on SZSE 
P L O T 
D o t e 
S Z A R S Z BR 
122 
Figure 2.1. Estimation time frame. 
This figure illustrates the time frame of estimation, contingent upon the processes of Chinese stock 
market liberalization. As indicated, the two regulatory reforms (i.e., the opening of the foreign B-
share market to Chinese domestic investors on February 19, 2001 and the opening of the domestic 
A-share market to QFII on November 5, 2002) have divided the sample into three subperiods: the 
pre-market-integration period, the post-market-integration period, and the period of market 
restructuring. 
1998 Feb 19,2001 Nov 5,2002 2006 
Market Restructuring 
Pre-Market-Integration Period Post—Market-Integration Period 
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Figure 3.2. Earnings management over time. 
These figures compare the magnitude of earnings management between cross-listed and 
non-cross-listed firms over the sample period from 1999 to 2006. For a rigorous analysis, 
earnings quality is measured using two alternative approaches: the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, \DA\, and accruals quality, AQ. Here, \DA\ is calculated using the 
modified Jones (1991) model and AQ is measured as the standard deviation of residuals from 
the model that regresses current accruals on the lagged, current, and future values of CFO, 
change in sales revenues, and gross PPE. The time frame of estimation spans the two 
regulatory reforms (i.e., the opening of the foreign B-share market to Chinese domestic 
investors in 2001 and the opening of the domestic A-share market to QFII in 2002). 
Discretionary Accruals 
Year 
PLOT H o n - C r o e a - l i a t e d F i rn ie C r o 8 8 - l i s t 9 d F i r m s 
Accruals Quality Measure 
0 . 0 8 2 
1999 2000 200 1 Z0C2 20(13 20 Oi 1005 
PLOT 
Y e or 
Non-Cr 03 9 - 1 i a t e d F i rin9 C r o s s - l i s t e d F i rms 
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Figure 2.1. Estimation time frame. 
This figure illustrates the time frame of estimation in testing stock price synchronicity before and 
after U.S. listing. To ensure a rigorous analysis, I require the sample firms to have at least three 
years of domestic A-share listings before and after their U.S. listings. In order to rule out short-run 
disturbance around U.S. listings, the pre- and post-cross-listing periods are constructed with a gap 
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Figure 4.2. Fit plots before and after U.S. listing. 
These figures compare the fit plots before and after U.S. listings for the 4 firms that have sufficient pre-
cross-listing histories. The fit plots during the pre- and post-cross-listing periods are presented on the left-
hand side and the right-hand side, respectively. 
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